Credit, Default, and Optimal Health Insurance by Jang, Youngsoo
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Credit, Default, and Optimal Health
Insurance
Jang, Youngsoo
Shanghai University of Finance and Economics - Institute for
Advanced Research
July 2019
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/95705/
MPRA Paper No. 95705, posted 26 Aug 2019 11:22 UTC
Credit, Default, and Optimal Health Insurance∗
Youngsoo Jang†
July 2019
Abstract
How do defaults and bankruptcies affect optimal health insurance policy? I answer this ques-
tion using a life-cycle model of health investment with the option to default on emergency
room (ER) bills and financial debts. I calibrate the model for the U.S. economy and compare
the optimal health insurance in the baseline economy with that in an economy with no option
to default. With no option to default, the optimal health insurance is similar to the health insur-
ance system in the baseline economy. In contrast, with the option to default, the optimal health
insurance system (i) expands the eligibility of Medicaid to 22 percent of the working-age pop-
ulation, (ii) replaces 72 percent of employer-based health insurance with a private individual
health insurance plus a progressive subsidy, and (iii) reforms the private individual health insur-
ance market by improving coverage rates and preventing price discrimination against people
with pre-existing conditions. This result implies that with the option to default, households
rely on bankruptcies and defaults on ER bills as implicit health insurance. More redistributive
healthcare reforms can improve welfare by reducing the dependence on this implicit health
insurance and changing households’ medical spending behavior to be more preventative.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies how defaults and bankruptcies affect optimal health insurance policy. Recently,
a growing body of empirical studies has investigated the interactions between health-related events
and household finance. Some studies find that healthcare reforms play a role in improving house-
holds’ financial outcomes, such as bankruptcy, delinquency, credit scores, and unpaid debts; others
show that bankruptcy and emergency room act as implicit health insurance because households
with a lower cost of bankruptcy are reluctant to buy health insurance by relying on these institu-
tional features.1 These empirical findings have been widely used to support the expansion of health
insurance coverage against financial shocks due to health issues. However, there are relatively few
structural approaches that examine how defaults and bankruptcies affect the design of optimal
health insurance policy. In this paper, I fill this void by using a rich general equilibrium model
to characterize the optimal health insurance policy according to whether the option to default is
available.
The assessment of health insurance policies is related to several off-setting forces in welfare
changes. On the one hand, health insurance improves welfare by mitigating health losses by pro-
viding more access to healthcare services due to a decrease in out-of-pocket medical expenses.
Additionally, health insurance improves welfare because it reduces bankruptcies and defaults on
medical bills by insuring financial risks from medical issues. On the other hand, expanding health
insurance coverage can deteriorate welfare because more taxes must be levied in order to be fi-
nanced. This increase in taxes increases the distortions of saving and labor supply, reducing the
average income. General equilibrium effects even amplify this reduction in the average income
by boosting the decrease in the aggregate supply of savings. Therefore, these trade-offs must be
quantified to characterize optimal health insurance policies.
I undertake my quantitative analysis by building a model on the consumer bankruptcy frame-
work used in Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima and Rı´os-Rull (2007); Livshits, MacGee and Tertilt
(2007) and the health capital framework of Grossman (1972, 2000, 2017). Asset markets are in-
complete, and households have the option to default on their medical bills and financial debts. If
a debtor defaults on his debt, the debt is eliminated, but his credit history is damaged. This de-
fault is recorded in his credit history, which hinders his borrowing in the future. The loan price
differs across individual states, as it is determined by individual expected default probabilities. In
the spirit of Grossman (1972, 2000, 2017), health capital is a component of individual utility and
affects labor productivity and the mortality rate. Moreover, health shocks depreciate the stock of
health capital, which results in reduced utility, labor productivity, and survival probability.
1Gross and Notowidigdo (2011); Mahoney (2015); Mazumder and Miller (2016); Hu et al. (2018); Miller et al.
(2018); Dobkin et al. (2018) are included in this literature. The details will be covered in Related Literature again.
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This model extends the standard health capital model in two directions. First, the model con-
siders two types of health shocks: emergency and non-emergency. This setting is chosen to reflect
the institutional features of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA), which
is an important channel for defaults on medical bills, as Mahoney (2015) and Dobkin, Finkelstein,
Kluender and Notowidigdo (2018) note in their empirical analyses.2 Second, motivated by the
study of Galama and Kapteyn (2011), health capital determines not the level of health but the
distributions of these health shocks. Individuals who accumulate a higher level of health capital
stock have a lower probability of emergency medical events and severe medical conditions, but
all individuals cannot directly buy the optimal level of health. This setting helps to address two
well-known criticisms for the model of Grossman (1972). First, the demand for medical and health
service is negatively related to health status in the data, but the model of Grossman (1972) predicts
that they are positively related, Second, the model of Grossman (1972) tends to exaggerate the
degree of the responses of individual medical spending to maintain health over the life-cycle. This
modeling strategy makes it possible to deal with these criticisms. Moreover, this set-up allows me
to capture the additional preventative medical treatment effects of health insurance policies.
Using micro and macro data, I calibrate two types of models to the U.S. economy: a model with
the option to default and a model with no option to default. They perform well in matching life-
cycle and cross-sectional moments on income, health insurance, medical expenditures, medical
conditions, and emergency room (ER) visits. These models account for salient life-cycle and
cross-sectional dimensions of health insurance and health inequality. Furthermore, they reproduce
the untargeted interrelationships among income, medical conditions, and ER visits.3 These strong
performances are largely achieved by the extended health capital framework. The model with the
option to default is also good at capturing important life-cycle and cross-sectional dimensions of
credit and bankruptcy.
To characterize optimal health insurance policies, this paper pays attention to three health in-
surance policy objects: the threshold of income eligibility for Medicaid, the subsidy rule for the
purchase of private individual health insurance, and a reform of the private individual health insur-
ance market that improves its coverage rates up to those of employer-based health insurance and
prevents price discrimination against pre-exiting conditions. These policy components are param-
eterized into three parameters. This setting is so flexible that it can represent not only pre-existing
healthcare systems around the world but also alternative healthcare reforms recently proposed in
2In the U.S., hospitals can assess the financial status of non-emergency patients before providing non-emergency
medical treatment, but they cannot take this financial screening step before providing emergency medical treatments
due to regulations in the EMTALA.
3Using data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), I find that the levels of health risks vary across
income groups. Low-income households tend to have more severe medical conditions and to visit emergency rooms
more frequently over the life-cycle.Appendix B describes the details of these empirical findings.
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the U.S. Based on this flexibility, I characterize the optimal health insurance, which is summarized
by a set of these three parameters maximizing a utilitarian welfare function that values the ex-ante
lifetime utility of an agent born into the stationary equilibrium. In this setting, I seek the optimal
health insurance with the option to default and that without the option to default.
I find that the option to default makes substantial differences in the features of these optimal
health insurance policies. In the economy with no option to default, the optimal health insurance
policy is close to the health insurance system in the baseline economy. The optimal health insur-
ance policy with no option to default reduces the threshold of income eligibility for Medicaid from
7 percent to 5.5 percent of the average income. This policy provides a progressive subsidy for the
purchase of private individual health insurance to households whose income is between 5.5 percent
and 10.8 percent of the average income and implements no reform on the private individual health
insurance market. In contrast, in the economy with the option to default, the optimal health insur-
ance system is much more redistributive. This optimal health insurance policy provides Medicaid
to households whose income is lower than 21.6 percent of the average income. The optimal health
insurance offers a progressive subsidy to all households whose income is above the threshold of
income eligibility for Medicaid. The optimal policy reforms the private individual health insur-
ance market by improving coverage rates and preventing price discrimination against pre-existing
conditions.
To understand the mechanism behind this result, I decompose the welfare changes into a com-
ponent related to changes in consumption and a component related to changes in health. I find
that in the economy with the option to default, changes in health are the main driving force behind
the welfare improvement of the optimal health insurance policy, while these changes are not in the
optimal policy with no option to default. This gap is driven by different responses of households’
medical spending to each of the optimal health insurance policies. In the economy with the op-
tion to default, the optimal health insurance policy increases young and low-income households’
medical spending, which decreases the overall level and dispersion of health risks and improves
health. However, with no option to default, the optimal policy does not bring such large changes
in households’ medical spending, which leads to smaller changes in health than the optimal health
insurance with the option to default does. This disparity is driven not by the difference between
the two optimal health insurance policies but by heterogeneous responses of households’ medical
spending. The optimal health insurance policy for the economy with the option to default does not
bring the same overall increases in medical spending over the life-cycle for the economy without
the option to default.
This different response of households’ medical spending implies that the option to default acts
as implicit health insurance, as Mahoney (2015) emphasizes. In the economy with no option to
default, households are more cautious in managing their health and spend on healthcare to be
3
more preventative because bad health would otherwise come as a huge financial burden over the
life-cycle. Thus, the optimal health insurance policy does not require a radical increase in the
degree of redistributiveness for health insurance policies. However, with the option to default,
young and low-income households can rely on the option to default to insure against health risks
as well as financial risks. Thus, households with the option to default are less eager to manage their
health than households without the option to default. The optimal health insurance policy reduces
the dependence on this implicit health insurance by providing young and low-income households
with more access to healthcare services because the policy decreases the effective prices of health
insurance for them. This change increases overall levels of health capital stock for young and
low-income households. Because health capital determines the distributions of health shocks,
young and low-income households experience a reduction in overall levels of health shocks and
improvements in health, thereby enhancing welfare. This finding implies that in economies where
bankruptcies and defaults are easily accessible, more redistributive healthcare reforms can improve
welfare by reducing the dependence on this implicit health insurance and changing households’
medical spending behavior to be more preventative.
Related Literature: This paper belongs to the stream of the model-based quantitative macroe-
conomic literature that investigates the aggregate and distributional implications of health-related
public policies.4 Motivated by the seminal work of Grossman (1972), many of these studies ad-
dress health as an investment goods that is affected by the behavior of investing efforts or resources.
Among them, my work is the most closely related to three papers: Zhao (2014), Jung and Tran
(2016), and Cole, Kim and Krueger (2018). Zhao (2014) studies the impacts of Social Security
on aggregate health spending in an endogenous health capital model. He finds that Social Security
increases aggregate health spending by reallocating resources to the old whose marginal propen-
sity to spending on health is high. The study of Zhao (2014) has a similarity to my work in the
sense that both studies investigate the effect of another type of public policy on health spending,
while my work focuses not on the effects of Social Security but on the impacts of defaults and
bankruptcies. Jung and Tran (2016) study the implications of the Affordable Care Act in a general
equilibrium model with investment in health capital. Although, as my work does, they examine
health insurance policies in a health investment model, the focus of my work is different because
their model does not address the design of the optimal health insurance policy. Furthermore, they
do not examine the effects of bankruptcies and defaults on healthcare spending. Cole, Kim and
Krueger (2018) study the trade-off between the short-run benefits of generous health insurance
policies and the long-run effects of health investment such as not smoking and exercising. The
4Suen et al. (2006); Hall and Jones (2007); Jeske and Kitao (2009); Attanasio, Kitao and Violante (2010); Ales,
Hosseini and Jones (2012); Pashchenko and Porapakkarm (2013); Hansen, Hsu and Lee (2014); Yogo (2016); Naka-
jima and Tu¨zemen (2017); Zhao (2017); Feng and Zhao (2018) are broadly included in this literature.
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modeling strategy they use for health risks is similar to that used in this work, as the distribution
of health shocks depends on health status. In addition, their result for the optimal health insurance
policy is similar to my work in the sense that providing full insurance is sub-optional. However,
Cole, Kim and Krueger (2018) do not pay attention to risk-sharing against health risks through
defaults and the accumulation of physical capital, which is formalized in my model.
This paper is in lined with the consumer bankruptcy literature based on quantitative models. In
this model, defaults and bankruptcies are based on the modelling setting proposed in Chatterjee,
Corbae, Nakajima and Rı´os-Rull (2007) in the sense that the loan prices are characterized by in-
dividual states, medical expenses represent a primary driver of default, and ex-post defaults exist
in general equilibrium. Livshits, MacGee and Tertilt (2007) is also closely related to this paper, as
they examine the effects of bankruptcy policies on consumption smoothing across states and over
the life-cycle. In both Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima and Rı´os-Rull (2007) and Livshits, MacGee
and Tertilt (2007), medical expenses are an important driving force of defaults, but neither study
includes the details of health insurance policies that reshape the distribution of default risks from
medical reasons across households. This paper extends these studies by employing the institu-
tional details of health insurance policies with endogenous health into the consumer bankruptcy
framework.
This study is linked to a growing stream of the empirical literature addressing the relationship
between health-related events and household financial well-being.5 Among these empirical studies,
the most closely related paper is Mahoney (2015). He finds that ER and bankruptcy act as implicit
health insurance because individuals with a lower financial cost of bankruptcy are more reluctant
to purchase health insurance and make lower out-of-pocket medical payments conditional on the
amount of care received. This study incorporates these institutional features in a structural model
and finds that they are substantially important in designing the optimal health insurance policy
because this implicit health insurance influences households’ medical spending behavior.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model, defines the equi-
librium, and explains the algorithm for the numerical solution. Section 3 describes the calibration
strategy and the performance of the model. Section 4 presents the results of the policy analysis.
Section 5 concludes this paper.
5These empirical studies estimate the effect of adverse health events and healthcare reforms on household finan-
cial consequences such as bankruptcy, delinquency, credit scores and unpaid debt. Gross and Notowidigdo (2011)
empirically show that Medicaid expansions for children reduced the probability of bankruptcy. Mazumder and Miller
(2016) find that the Massachusetts healthcare reform decreased bankruptcy, delinquency and the amount of debt, and
it improved credit scores. Hu, Kaestner, Mazumder, Miller and Wong (2018) find that the Medicaid expansions un-
der the Affordable Care Act (ACA) generally improved financial well-being for low-income households. Miller, Hu,
Kaestner, Mazumder and Wong (2018) empirically show that the Medicaid expansions under the ACA reduced unpaid
bills, medical bills, over-limit credit card spending, delinquencies and public records in Michigan. Dobkin, Finkel-
stein, Kluender and Notowidigdo (2018) show that hospital admissions reduced earnings, income, access to credit and
consumer borrowing, and they increased out-of-pocket medical spending, unpaid medical bills and bankruptcy.
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2 Model
2.1 Overview
Many components of this model are employed in the consumer bankruptcy literature (e.g., Chatter-
jee, Corbae, Nakajima and Rı´os-Rull (2007); Livshits, MacGee and Tertilt (2007, 2010); Athreya
(2008); Nakajima and Rı´os-Rull (2014)) and health capital literature (e.g., Grossman (1972, 2000,
2017); Zhao (2014); Yogo (2016); Jung and Tran (2016)). The consumer bankruptcy framework
provides a lens through which I can examine how bankruptcies and defaults interact with health
insurance policies. Treating health as endogenous allows me to examine how healthcare reforms
reshape the behavior of spending on healthcare over time and across states, which influences the
evolution of health over the life-cycle. This relationship arises because compared to older people,
for young people, spending on healthcare has more impacts on their health. Moreover, as empirical
studies have shown, health affects labor productivity.6 This relationship implies that considering
endogenous health status is also important in analyzing how healthcare reforms influence earnings
over the life-cycle.
The model has two distinctive features compared to the literature. First, I distinguish between
emergency and non-emergency medical events to reflect institutional features related to the use
of emergency rooms, which is an important channel for medical defaults in the U.S. According
to the EMTALA, hospitals can assess the financial status of non-emergency patients before pro-
viding non-emergency medical treatment, but they cannot take this financial screening step before
delivering emergency medical treatments. The cost is huge. Holmes and Madans (2013) show that
unpaid debts in emergency departments represent 6% of total hospital costs. In addition, 55% of
U.S. emergency care is uncompensated. This institutional feature is captured by separating health
shocks into emergency health shocks and non-emergency health shocks.
Second, motivated by Galama and Kapteyn (2011), health capital affects the distribution of
health shocks such that when a person has more health capital, he is less likely to experience
severe or emergency medical events.Yet all households cannot directly buy the optimal level of
health. This setting is helpful to address two criticisms for the model of Grossman (1972). First,
the demand for medical and health service is negatively related to health in data, but the model
of Grossman (1972) predicts that they are positively related, Second, the model of Grossman
(1972) tends to exaggerate the degree of the responses of individual medical spending to main-
tain health over the life-cycle. As Galama and Kapteyn (2011) note, this modeling strategy allows
me to address these criticisms. In addition, the additional preventative medical treatment effects
of healthcare reforms must be captured, and interrelations among income, health risks and finan-
6Jones (2008) and Currie and Madrian (1999) review empirical evidence on the effect of health shocks on labor
outcomes.
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cial risks observed in micro data must be explained. Data show that levels of health risks vary
across income groups. Low-income households tend to have more severe medical conditions and
to visit emergency rooms more often. Data also demonstrate that those who have a record of filing
for bankruptcies have lower levels of earnings and worse health status. Appendix B describes the
details of these findings.
In the following sections, I describe the details of households, firms, financial intermediaries,
hospitals and the government; then, I define the recursive general equilibrium of the model’s sta-
tionary distribution.
2.2 Households
2.2.1 Household Environments
Demographics: The economy is populated by a continuum of households in J overlapping
generations. This is a triennial model. They begin at age J0 and work. They retire at age
Jr, and the maximum survival age is J¯ . In each period, the survival rate is endogenously
determined. The model has exogenous population growth rate n. There are 7 age groups,
jg : 23− 34, 35− 46, 47− 55, 56− 64, 65− 76, 77− 91 and 92− 100.
Preferences: Preferences are represented by an isoelastic utility function over an aggregate that
is itself a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function over consumption c and current health
status hc,
u(c, hc) =
[(
λuc
v−1
v + (1− λu)h
v−1
v
c
) v
v−1
]1−σ
1− σ
(1)
where λu is the weight on consumption, v is the elasticity of substitution between consumption c
and health status hc, and σ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
Labor Income: Working households at age j receive an idiosyncratic labor income yj given by
log (yj) = log (w) + log (ω¯j) + φh log (hc) + log (η) (2)
η
′
= ρηη + ǫ, ǫ ∼ N(0, σǫ)
wherew is the aggregate market wage, ω¯j is a deterministic age term, hc is the current health status,
φh is the elasticity of labor income yj to health status hc and η is an idiosyncratic productivity
shock. η follows the above AR-1 process with a persistence of ρη and a persistent shock ǫ with a
normal distribution.
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Health Technology: In the model, health shocks interact with health capital. First, given health
capital, I demonstrate how health shocks evolve. Next, I describe how health capital is intertempo-
rally determined.
The model has two types of health shocks: emergency ǫe and non-emergency ǫn. These two
shocks determine current health status hc in the following way:
hc = (1− ǫe)(1− ǫn)h (3)
where hc is the current health status, ǫe is an emergency health shock, ǫn is a non-emergency health
shock, and h is the stock of health capital. Emergency health shocks ǫe and non-emergency health
shocks ǫn depreciate health capital h, and the remaining health capital becomes the current health
status hc. Note that current health status hc is different from the stock of health capital h.
Let us begin with emergency health shock ǫe. Households face emergency health shocks ǫe
only when they experience an emergency medical event. The probability of emergency medical
events is as follows:
Xer =

1 with probability
(1−h+κe)
Ajg
0 with probability 1− (1−h+κe)
Ajg
(4)
where Xer is a random variable of emergency medical events, and h is the stock of health capital.
Regarding the probability function of emergency medical events, ke is the scale parameter, and
Ajg is the age group effect parameter. ke controls the average probability of emergency room
events, and Ajg influences the difference in probability across age groups. Households experience
an emergency medical event Xer = 1 with probability (1 − h + κe)/Ajg . This equation implies
that health capital h determines the probability of emergency medical events.7 When a household
has more health capital, it is less likely to experience emergency medical events.
Conditional on an emergency medical event, Xer = 1, emergency health shocks ǫe evolve as
follows:
ǫe =

ǫse with probability pse conditional on Xer = 1ǫne with probability 1− pse conditional on Xer = 1 (5)
where
0 < ǫne < ǫse < 1 and 0 < me(ǫne) < me(ǫse)
7For example, let us assume that Ajg = 1 and ke = 0, and I compare two households: household A with h = 0.5
and household B with h = 0.8. Then, the probability of emergency medical events for household A is 0.5, while that
for household B is 0.2.
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where (ǫne) ǫse is a (non-) severe emergency health shock, pse is the probability of the realization
of a severe emergency health shock ǫse and (me(ǫne))me(ǫse) is the medical cost of a (non-) severe
emergency medical shock. A severe emergency health shock is larger than a non-severe emergency
health shock. As examples of severe emergency health shocks, one might consider ER events such
as car accidents and gunshot wounds. Non-severe emergency health shocks imply less serious ER
events such as allergies or pink eye. These emergency health shocks incur emergency medical
costs me(·). Note that emergency medical costs me(·) are not a choice variable; rather they are a
function of emergency health shock ǫ ∈ {ǫne, ǫde}. Severe emergency health shocks incur higher
medical costs than non-emergency health shocks,me(ǫne) < me(ǫse).
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Non-emergency health shock ǫn evolves as follows:
ǫn ∼ TN
(
µ = 0, σ =
((1/h)− 1 + κn)
αn
Bjg
, a = 0, b = 1
)
(6)
where TN(µ, σ, a, b) is a truncated normal distribution on bounded interval [a, b], for which the
mean and standard deviation of its original normal distribution are µ and σ, respectively. Let us
denote σ as the dispersion of the distribution of non-emergency health shocks. The dispersion σ
is a function of health capital h with three parameters: κn, αn and Bjg . Regarding the dispersion
of the distribution of non-emergency health shocks, κn is the scale parameter, αn is the curvature
parameter, andBjg is the age group effect parameter. kn controls the overall size of non-emergency
health shocks, αn determines the extent to which differences in health capital affect the level of
dispersion σ, and Bjg influences the extent to which the level of dispersion σ differs across age
groups.
Health capital determines the distribution of non-emergency health shocks through its disper-
sion σ. Figure 1 illustrates how health capital determines the distribution of non-emergency health
shocks. The horizontal axis indicates the size of non-emergency health shocks, and the verti-
cal axis indicates the value of the probability density function of non-emergency health shocks.
Given values of parameters kn, αn and Bjg , the dispersion of non-emergency health shocks,
σ = ((1/h)−1+κn)
αn
Bjg
, decreases with health capital h. Thus, the probability density function of
non-emergency health shocks tends to be concentrated more around 0 if the level of health capi-
tal h is high, as the left-hand side graph in Figure 1 shows. This concentration means that those
who accumulate a larger stock of health capital are less likely to confront a large non-emergency
8Households do not make a decision on the amounts of emergency medical costs, which are determined by the
severity of emergency medical events. This setting may appear inconsistent with the data, for example, because either
the rich or the poor spend more on emergency room healthcare conditional on visiting an emergency room. However,
I find that, using data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), the amount charged for emergency room
events is unrelated to income levels conditional on visiting an emergency room, which supports the choice of the
emergency room setting. These results are presented in Appendix A.
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f(·;hhigh, κn, αn, Bjg)
ǫn
0 0.33 0.66 0.99
f(·;hlow, κn, αn, Bjg)
ǫn
0 0.33 0.66 0.99
Figure 1: Distribution of Non-emergency Health Shocks across Levels of Health Capital
(hhigh > hlow)
health shock. On the other hand, if a household has a low stock of health capital, the dispersion
of the distribution of non-emergency health shocks is high, as the right-hand side graph in Figure
1 shows. This dispersion means that this agent is more likely to face a substantial non-emergency
health shock.
To model health technology, I modify the health capital model of Grossman (1972, 2000, 2017).
In the spirit of his work, health capital evolves as follows:
h
′
= hc + ψjgm
ϕjg
n = (1− ǫe)(1− ǫn)h+ ψjgm
ϕjg
n (7)
where h
′
is the stock of health capital in the next period, hc is the current health status, ǫe represents
emergency health shocks, ǫn represents non-emergency health shocks, h is the stock of health
capital in the current period, ψjg is the efficiency of non-emergency health technology for age
group jg, and ϕjg is the curvature of the non-emergency medical expenditure function. Households
invest in health capital through non-emergency medical expendituresmn. Then, households’ total
medical expendituresm are given by
m = mn +me(ǫ) (8)
wheremn andme(ǫe) are non-emergency and emergency medical expenditures, respectively.
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This health technology differs in two key ways from that in other health capital models. First,
the stock of health capital h is different from the current health status hc = (1 − ǫn)(1 − ǫe). Al-
though the stock of health capital h determines the distributions of emergency and non-emergency
health shocks, households cannot directly buy perfect health, as a full level of health capital does
not guarantee no health shock. This phenomenon prevents rich and old households from always
maintaining the best health status. Second, emergency and non-emergency medical expenditures
differ in their features and roles. Non-emergency medical expendituremn is discretionary because
it is a choice variable. However, emergency medical expenditures me(·) are non-discretionary as
they are given by emergency health shocks ǫe. Moreover, only non-emergency medical expendi-
tures mn play a role in accumulating the stock of health capital in the next period, h
′
. Emergency
medical costs me(·) do not affect the accumulation of health capital. This choice reflects that the
recovery after emergency medical treatments depends on non-emergency medical treatments. If
a poor household faces an emergency health shock, it will receive emergency medical treatments
regardless of whether it can pay due to the EMTALA. However, such patients may not obtain suffi-
cient recovery treatments due to their tight budget constraints, as recovery treatments are included
in non-emergency medical treatments. Thus, this insufficient recovery treatments induce a low
level of health capital the low-income household has. Recall that health capital h determines two
objects: the distribution of emergency medical events Xer and the distribution of non-emergency
health shocks TN(0, σ = ((1/h)−1+κn)
αn
Bjg
, 0, 1).
Survival Probability: A Household’s survival probability is given by
πj+1|j(hc, jg) = 1− Γjg · exp (−νhc) (9)
where πj+1|j(h
′
, jg) is the survival probability of living up to age j + 1 conditional on surviving
at age j in age group jg with current health status hc, Γjg is the age group effect parameter of the
survival probability, and ν is the curvature of the survival probability with respect to current health
status hc. The age group effect parameter of the survival probability Γjg controls overall age effects
up to death. Older age groups have a higher value of Γjg . The curvature parameter of the survival
probability ν captures differences in households’ survival rate by current health status hc.
Health Insurance: The health insurance plans in the benchmark model resemble those in the U.S.
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For working-age households, the choice set of health insurance plans is given by
i ∈


{NHI,MCD, IHI,EHI} if y ≤ y¯ & ω = 1
{NHI,MCD, IHI} if y ≤ y¯ & ω = 0
{NHI, IHI,EHI} if y > y¯ & ω = 1
{NHI, IHI} if y > y¯ & ω = 0
(10)
where i is health insurance status, NHI indicates no health insurance, MCD is Medicaid, IHI
is private individual health insurance, EHI is employer-based health insurance, y is individual
income, y¯ is the income threshold for Medicaid eligibility, and ω is the offer of employer-based
health insurance.
Medicaid MCD is available only for low-income working-age households. Thus, if a house-
hold’s income is below the income threshold for Medicaid eligibility y¯, it can take Medicaid. Oth-
erwise, MedicaidMCD is not available as an insurance choice. Individual private health insurance
IHI is available to every working-age household. Households do not have any requirement to buy
it.
Employer-based health insurance EHI is available only to those who have an offer ω from
their employers. Jeske and Kitao (2009) show that the offer rate of employer-based health insur-
ance EHI tends to be higher in high-salary jobs. Thus, I assume that the offer of employer-based
health insurance EHI is randomly determined, and the probability of an offer of employer-based
health insurance increases with households’ persistent component of idiosyncratic labor produc-
tivity shock η. Explicitly, the likelihood of an offer of employer-based health insurance EHI is
given by p(EHI|η), where η is the persistent component of the idiosyncratic shock to earnings.
Following Jeske and Kitao (2009), the offer probability p(EHI|η) increases with η.
The price of private health insurance is given by
pi′ (hc, jg) =


0 if i
′
= NHI or i
′
= MCD
pIHI(hc, jg) if i
′
= IHI
pEHI if i
′
= EHI
(11)
where pi′ (·, ·) is a premium for health insurance i
′
for the next period, hc is the current health
status, and jg is the age group. pIHI(hc, jg) is the health insurance premium of private individual
health insurance IHI for an insured individual whose health status is hc within age group jg, and
pEHI is the premium for employer-based health insurance.
Individual private health insurance IHI and employer-based health insurance EHI differ in
the price system. Individual health insurance has premiums pIHI(hc, jg), where hc and jg are
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the current health status and age group, respectively. This setting is based on the individual
private health insurance market in the U.S. before the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Individual
private health insurance providers are allowed to differentiate prices by considering customers’
pre-existing conditions, age and smoking status. Contrary to the separating equilibrium of indi-
vidual health insurance IHI , employer-based health insurance EHI has a single premium pEHI .
This price is independent of any individual state, which reflects that in the U.S., the providers of
employer-based health insurance cannot discriminate against employees based on their pre-existing
conditions due to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). In addition,
a fraction ψEHI ∈ (0, 1) of the premium pEHI is covered by employers, so insurance holders pay
(1− ψEHI) · pEHI .
All health insurance plans provide coverage qi·m, and (1−qi)m becomes an out-of-pocket med-
ical expenditure for an insured household. For example, for Medicaid holders, Medicaid MCD
covers qMCD ·m, and (1− qMCD) ·m represents their out-of-pocket medical expenditures.
Retired households use Medicare. Medicare is public health insurance for elderly households.
I assume that all retired households use Medicare and do not access the private health insurance
market.
Default: The model has two types of default based on the source of debt: financial default and non-
financial default. Following Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima and Rı´os-Rull (2007), Livshits, MacGee
and Tertilt (2007) and Nakajima and Rı´os-Rull (2014), financial default is modeled to capture the
procedures and consequences of Chapter 7 bankruptcy.9 Non-financial default is modeled to reflect
the features of the EMTALA.
Households have either a good credit history or a bad credit history. Good credit history means
that the credit record has no bankruptcy. Bad credit history implies that the household’s credit
record has a bankruptcy. The type of credit history determines the range of feasible actions of
households in the financial markets.
Households with a good credit history can either save or borrow through unsecured debt. They
can default on both financial and medical debts by filing for bankruptcy. In the period when filing
for bankruptcy, these households can neither save nor dis-save. They have a bad credit history in
the next period. If a household with a good credit history either has no debt or repays its unsecured
debt, it preserves its good credit history in the next period.
Households with a bad credit history pay a cost for having a bad credit history that is as much
as χ portion of their earnings for each period. Households with a bad credit history can save assets
but cannot borrow from financial intermediaries. Because of the absence of financial debt, they
do not engage in financial default. However, they can default on emergency medical expenses,
9Chapter 7 covers 70 percent of household bankruptcies. The other type of household bankruptcy is Chapter 13,
which I do not address here.
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as the EMTALA requires hospitals to provide emergency medical treatment to patients on credit
regardless of patients’ ability to pay the emergency medical costs. In the period when defaulting
on emergency medical expenses, these households cannot save, and they preserve the bad credit
history in the next period. Unless they default, with an exogenous probability λ, their bad credit
history changes to a good credit history in the next period.
Tax System and Government Budget: Taxes are levied from two sources: payroll and income.
On the one hand, Social Security and Medicare are financed through payroll tax. τss is the payroll
tax rate for Social Security, and τmed is that for Medicare. On the other hand, income tax covers
government expenditure G, Medicaid qd and the subsidy for employer-based health insurance ψpe.
I choose the progressive tax function from Gouveia and Strauss (1994), which has been widely
used in the macroeconomic policy literature. The income tax function T (y) is given by
T (y) = a0{y − (y
−a1 + a2)
−1/a1}+ τyy (12)
where y is taxable income. a0 denotes the upper bound of the progressive tax as income y goes to
infinity. a1 determines the curvature of the progressive tax function, and a2 is a scale parameter.
To use Gouveia and Strauss’s (1994) estimation result, I take their estimates in a0 and a1. a2 is
calibrated to match a target that is the fraction of total revenues financed by progressive income tax,
which is 65 percent (OECD Revenue Statistics 2002). τy is chosen to balance the total government
budget.
2.2.2 Dynamic Household Problems
Households experience two phases of the life-cycle: working and retirement. For each period,
households have either good or bad credit history. Good credit history means that the household
has a record for a bankruptcy filing in its recent credit history. Bad credit history implies that the
household has no such record. Here, I focus on explaining the choice problem of working-age
households with good credit history because their choice problem is so informative as to under-
stand decisions all the other types of households can make. Appendix C describes all types of the
dynamic household problems in recursive form.
Figure 2 shows the time-line of events for working-age households with a good credit history.
Each period consists of two sub-periods. At the beginning of sub-period 1, assets a, health insur-
ance status i and stock of health capital h are given from the previous period. Then, emergency
health shocks ǫe, non-emergency health shocks ǫn, non-medical expenditure shocks ζ , uninsurable
idiosyncratic shocks to the efficient units of labor η and an offer of employer-based health insur-
ance ω are realized. These health shocks affect households’ utility, labor productivity and mortality.
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(a, i, h)
Assets,
health insurance,
health capital
are given
t
(ǫe,me(ǫe), ǫn, ζ, η, ω)
ER health shocks, ER expenses,
non-ER health shocks,
non-medical expenditure shocks,
labor earnings shocks
and the offer of EHI realize
t+ 1
t+ 1
Non-Defaulters
Defaulters
Good Credit History
Bad Credit History
choose consumption,
non-ER medical expenditures,
the purchase of health insurance
and saving or borrowing
choose consumption
non-ER medical expenditures
and the purchase of health insurance
(c,mn, i
′
, a
′
)
(c,mn, i
′
)
Non-defaulters
pay back financial debt, a < 0
and ER bill,me(ǫe).
Defaulters do not pay back
financial debt, a < 0
and ER bill,me(ǫe).
Figure 2: Time-line of Events for Working-age Households with a Good Credit History
Emergency health shocks ǫe incur specific sizes of non-discretionary medical costs me(ǫe).
10 Let
V Gj (a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, ζ, η, ω) denote the value of working-age households with a good credit history in
sub-period 1. They solve
V Gj (a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, ζ, η, ω) = max {v
G,N
j (a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ζ, ω), v
G,D
j (i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω)} (13)
where vG,Nj (a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω) is the value of non-defaulting with good credit history and
vG,Dj (i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω) is the value of defaulting with a good credit history. The defaulting value,
vG,Dj (i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω), does not depend on the current assets, a, and non-medical expenditure
shocks, ζ , because all debts are eliminated with the default decision.
In sub-period 2, the available choices differ with default decision in sub-period 1. Non-
10This setting means that the amount of emergency medical costs is independent of households’ income. This setting
is supported by evidence in micro data. Using data from the MEPS, I find that, conditional on the use of emergency
rooms, the amount of emergency room charges is unrelated to households’ income. Further details are presented in
Appendix A.
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defaulting working-age households with a good credit history at age j in age group jg solve
vG,Nj (a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, ζ, η, ω) = max
{c, a
′
, i
′
, mn≥0}
[(
λuc
v−1
v + (1− λu)h
v−1
v
c
) v
v−1
]1−σ
1− σ
+ βπj+1|j(hc, jg) E
ǫ′e|h
′ ,ǫ′n|h
′
,η
′
|η,ω
′
|η
′
,ζ
′
[
V Gj+1(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
, ǫ
′
e, ǫ
′
n, ζ
′
, η
′
, ω
′
)
]
(14)
such that
c+ q(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
; j, η)a
′
+ pi′ (hc, jg)
≤ (1− τss − τmed)wω¯jh
φh
c η + a+ κ
− (1− qni )mn − (1− q
e
i )me(ǫe)− ζ − T (y)
ζ ∼ U [0, ζ¯]
h
′
= hc + ϕjgm
ψjg
n = (1− ǫn)(1− ǫe)h+ ϕjgm
ψjg
n
y = wωjh
φh
c η + (
1
qrf
− 1)a · 1a>0
the feasible set of health insurance choice i follows (10) , and
the health insurance premium pi′ (hc, jg) follows (11).
Non-defaulting working-age households with a good credit history make decisions on consumption
c, saving or debt a
′
, the purchase of health insurance for the next period i
′
and non-emergency
medical expenditures mn. They earn labor income wω¯jh
φh
c η and accidental bequest κ. They pay
out-of-pocket medical costs, the amount of which differs based on insurance status. If a household
purchased health insurance in the previous period, the insurance company covers a part of its
medical expenditure, qni mn+q
e
ime(ǫe)where q
n
i (q
e
i ) is the fraction of non-emergency (emergency)
medical expenditure health insurance i covers.11 The rest of the medical expense is the household’s
out-of-pocket medical expenditure, (1− qni )mn+(1− q
e
i )me(ǫe). If a household did not purchase
health insurance in the previous period, the total medical expenditure is the same as the household’s
out-of-pocket medical expenditure, qni = q
e
i = 0. They also pay costs incurred by non-medical
expenditure shocks, ζ , which follows a uniform distribution of U [0, ζ¯] . These households pay a
progressive tax T (·) based on their income y. They preserve their good credit history to the next
period.
11The fraction of medical expenses covered by health insurance differs between emergency and non-emergency
treatments. According to the MEPS, the coverage rates of health insurances are larger for the case of emergency
medical treatments. More details are described in Section 3 (calibration).
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Health insurance plays both roles. First, health insurance decreases the marginal cost of invest-
ing in health capital by reducing the out-of-pocket medical expenses for non-emergency treatment.
Second, health insurance partially insures the risk of emergency medical expense shocks. Since
physical capital a can also play the same roles, how the relative price of health capital h to phys-
ical capital a changes is a key to determining the allocation of these two types of capital. Health
insurance policies alter this relative price. If a health insurance policy subsidizes the purchase of
health insurance to poor households, they face a lower relative price of health capital h to physi-
cal capital h than rich households and decide to increase their medical spending. This individual
change in medical spending behavior results in a reallocation of health h and physical a capital
over households.
Defaulting working-age households with a good credit history at age j in age group jg solve
vG,Dj (i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω) = max
{c, i′ , mn≥0}
[(
λuc
v−1
v + (1− λu)h
v−1
v
c
) v
v−1
]1−σ
1− σ
+ βπj+1|j(hc, jg) E
ǫ
′
e|h
′
,ǫ
′
n|h
′
,η
′
|η,ω
′
|η
′
,ζ
′
[
V Bj+1(0, i
′
, h
′
, ǫ
′
e, ǫ
′
n, ζ
′, η
′
, ω
′
)
]
(15)
such that
c+ pi′ (hc, jg) = (1− τss − τmed)wω¯jh
φh
c η − (1− q
n
i )mn − T (y) + κ
h
′
= hc + ϕjgm
ψjg
n = (1− ǫn)(1− ǫe)h+ ϕjgm
ψjg
n
y = wωjh
φh
c η
the feasible set of health insurance choice i follows (10) , and
the health insurance premium pi′ (hc, jg) follows (11).
Defaulting working-age households with a good credit history make decisions on consumption c,
health insurance i
′
for the next period and non-emergency medical expenditures mn, but they can
neither save nor dis-save in this period, a
′
= 0. As non-defaulting households do, the out-of-
pocket medical expenses depend on their health insurance status. However, contrary to the case of
non-defaulting households, these households do not repay emergency medical expenses ǫe because
they have an exemption from them. They also have exemptions from the unsecured financial debt
a < 0 and costs incurred by non-medical expenditure shocks ζ . The exemptions from those debts
are given at the cost of their credit record. Their credit history will become bad in the next period.
A majority of the decision-making problems of working-age households with bad credit history
are nearly identical to those of non-default households with good credit history. The problems they
face in sub-period 1 are the same as the problems of working-age households with good credit
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history. In sub-period 2, as non-defaulters with good credit history do, non-defaulters with bad
credit choose consumption c, health insurance for the next period i
′
, and non-emergency medical
expenditures mn. They pay out-of-pocket medical costs as working households with good credit
history do, (1 − qni )mn + (1 − q
e
i )me(ǫe). However, contrary to the case of non-defaulters with
a good credit history, non-defaulters with a bad credit history are not allowed to borrow, a ≥ 0,
and pay a pecuniary cost of having a bad credit history equal to some fraction of their earnings,
ξwω¯jh
φh
c η. In addition, their credit history is randomly determined in the next period. Defaulters
with bad credit history pay a pecuniary cost of having a bad credit history equal to some fraction
of their earnings, ξwω¯jh
φh
c η. They can neither save nor dis-save, a
′
= 0, and they make decisions
on consumption c, health insurance for the next period i
′
and non-emergency medical expenditures
mn. Defaulters with bad credit history also do not repay emergency medical costs ǫe and non-
medical expenses ζ , so (1−qni )mn becomes their out-of-pocket medical cost.
12 They maintain bad
credit history in the next period.
It is worthwhile mentioning the difference between filing for bankruptcy and defaulting. The
bankruptcy system of this model is to capture the features of the Chapter 7 Bankruptcy in the U.S.
Since refilling bankruptcy is not allowed on average for ten years in the U.S., I assume that only
those who have a good credit history can file for bankruptcy. However, this does not mean those
who have a bad credit history cannot default on debts. Households with a bad credit history are
allowed to default on non-financial debts such as ER bills and costs from divorce.
Retired households do not have any labor income but receive Social Security benefits. Bor-
rowing is not allowed for them, a
′
≥ 0. I assume that all retired households have Medicare and
do not use any private health insurance. At the beginning of each period, retired households face
non-medical expenditure shocks ζ , emergency health shocks ǫe, and non-emergency health shocks
ǫn. They make decisions on consumption c, saving or debt a
′
, and non-emergency medical expen-
dituresmn. They pay out-of-pocket medical costs, (1− q
n
med)mn + (1− q
e
med)me(ǫe).
2.3 Firm
The economy has a representative firm. The firm maximizes its profit by solving the following
problem:
max
K,N
{zF (K,N)− wN − rK} (16)
where z is the total factor productivity (TFP), K is the aggregate capital stock, N is aggregate labor,
and r is the capital rental rate.
12They do not have any debt via the financial sector, as those with bad credit cannot borrow regardless of their
default decision.
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2.4 Financial Intermediaries
There are competitive financial intermediaries, and loans are defined by each state. This system
implies that with the law of large numbers, ex post-realized profits of lenders are zero for each type
of loan. The lenders can observe the state of each borrower, and the price of loans is determined
using good credit-status households’ default probability and the risk-free interest rate.13
Specifically, the default probability of a household with a good credit history G, total debt
a
′
, insurance purchase status i
′
, health capital for the next period h
′
, current age j and current
idiosyncratic earnings shock η in the next period is given by
d(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
; j, η) = (17)∑
ǫ
′
n,ǫ
′
e,η
′
,ω
′
,ζ
′
πǫ′e|h
′πǫ′n|h
′πη′ |ηπω′ |η′πζ′1{vG,N (a′ ,i′ ,h′ ,ǫ′e,ǫ
′
n,η
′
,ω
′
,j+1) ≤ vG,D(i
′
,h
′
,ǫ
′
e,ǫ
′
n,η
′ ,ω′ ,j+1)}
where πǫ′e|h′ is the probability of an emergency health shock ǫ
′
e in the next period conditional on
health capital h
′
for the next period, πǫ′n|h
′ is the probability of a non-emergency health shock
ǫn in the next period conditional on health capital h
′
for the next period, πη′ |η is the transitional
probability of idiosyncratic shocks on earnings η
′
in the next period conditional on the current
idiosyncratic shocks on earnings η, and πω′ |η′ is the probability of the offer of employer-based
health insurance in the next period conditional on the idiosyncratic shock to earnings η
′
in the next
period.
The zero-profit condition of the financial intermediaries that make a loan of amount a
′
to house-
holds with age j, current idiosyncratic labor productivity η, health capital h
′
for the next period,
and health insurance i
′
for the next period is given by
(1 + rrf ) q(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
; j, η) a
′
= (1− d(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
; j, η)) a
′
(18)
where rrf is the risk-free interest rate and q(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
; j, η) is the discount rate of the loan price.14
Then, the discount rate of the loan price q(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
; j, η) is
q(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
; j, η) =
1− d(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
; j, η)
1 + rrf
. (19)
13Note that households with a bad credit history cannot access the financial market.
14Financial intermediaries consider both households’ health insurance i
′
and health capital h
′
for the next period
to price loans. This assumption is necessary to solve the model, as no pooling equilibrium exists under symmetric
information between lenders and borrowers. Solving default models under asymmetric information is beyond the
scope of this paper.
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2.5 Hospital
The economy has a representative agent hospital. For convenience, I denote household state s as
(a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω) and credit history as υ ∈ {G,B}; the hospital earns the following revenue:
mn(s, j) + (1− gd(s, j)) me(ǫe) + gd(s, j) max (a, 0) (20)
wheremn(s, j) is the decision rule for non-emergency medical expenditures for households of state
s at age j. me(ǫe) is emergency medical expenses for emergency health shocks ǫe, and gd(s, j) is
the decision rule for defaulting for households of state s at age j. All households always pay
non-emergency medical expenditures mn, regardless of whether they default, as the hospital can
assess patients’ financial abilities before providing non-emergency medical treatment. However,
the payment amount for emergency medical treatments me(ǫe) depends on individual default de-
cisions. This is because the EMTALA requires hospitals to provide emergency medical treatment
regardless of whether the patients can pay their emergency medical bills. Non-defaulters repay all
of their emergency medical expenditures to the hospital, but defaulters provide their assets instead
of paying emergency medical expenses. If the asset level of these individuals is below 0 (debt), the
hospital receives no payment.
For each period t, hospital profits are given by
J¯∑
j=J0
∫
{[mn(s, j) + (1− gd(s, j))me(ǫe) + gd(s, j) max (a, 0)] (21)
−
(mn(s, j) +me(ǫe))
ζ
}dµ(s, j)
where ζ is the mark-up of the hospital, and µ(s, j) is the measure of households at age j of state
s. Following Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima and Rı´os-Rull (2007), mark-up ζ is adjusted to ensure
zero profits in equilibrium.15
Note that the mark-up of the hospital ζ is an instrument through which I can evaluate the
efficiency of healthcare policies in terms of healthcare providers, because the size of the hospital’s
mark-up ζ increases with unpaid medical debt.
2.6 Equilibrium
Appendix E defines a recursive competitive equilibrium.
15Note that the object of default is here only emergency medical expenditures, while that in Chatterjee, Corbae,
Nakajima and Rı´os-Rull (2007) is all medical expenditures.
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2.7 Numerical Solution Algorithm
Here, I describe the key ideas of the numerical solution algorithm. Appendix G demonstrates each
step of the algorithm with details.
Substantial computational burdens are involved in solving the model. The model has a large
number of individual state variables, and loan prices depend on the state of individuals due to the
endogenous default setting. Moreover, the model has many parameters that must be adjusted to
match cross-sectional and life-cycle moments in the model with those in the data.
To solve the model, I apply an endogenous grid method to the variable of asset holdings a
′
for the next period and discretize the variables of health capital h
′
for the next period and health
insurance i
′
for the next period because the variation of asset holdings a
′
is the largest among
endogenous state variables. The endogenous grid method I use is an extension of Fella’s (2014)
method. Fella (2014) develops an endogenous grid method to solve models with discrete choices
under an exogenous borrowing limit. One of the main contributions of Fella (2014) is an algo-
rithm identifying concave regions over the solution set, to which Carroll’s (2006) endogenous grid
method is applicable. However, Fella’s (2014) endogenous grid method is not directly applica-
ble to models with default options, as these models do not have any predetermined feasible set
of solutions. Based on the theoretical findings of Arellano (2008); Clausen and Strub (2017), I
add a numerical procedure for finding the lower bound of feasible sets for the solution to Fella’s
(2014) algorithm that identifies concave regions over the solution sets, which allows me to use the
endogenous grid method to solve this model.
Definition 2.7.1. For each (¯i
′
, h¯
′
; j, η), a
′
rbl(¯i
′
, h¯
′
; j, η) is the risky borrowing limit if
∀a
′
≥ a
′
rbl(a
′
, i¯
′
, h¯
′
; j, η),
∂q(a
′
, i¯
′
, h¯
′
; j, η)a
′
∂a′
=
∂q(a
′
, i¯
′
, h¯
′
; j, η)
∂a′
a
′
+ q(a
′
, i¯
′
, h¯
′
; j, η) > 0.
I numerically compute the risky borrowing limit for each state and take it as the lower bound
of feasible sets for solution a
′
. To use the endogenous grid method, a first-order condition (FOC)
is required. The following proposition guarantees the existence of an FOC and provides the form
of the FOC, which is needed to use the endogenous grid method.
Proposition 2.7.1. Given a pair of (ǫe, ǫn), for any (¯i
′
, h¯
′
, j, η) and for any a
′
≥ a
′
rbl(¯i
′
, h¯
′
; j, η),
(i) the FOC of asset holdings a
′
exists, and
(ii) the FOC is as follows:
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∂q(a
′
, i¯
′
, h¯
′
; j, η)a
′
∂a′
∂u(c, (1− ǫe)(1− ǫn)h¯)
∂c
=
∂WG(a
′
, i¯
′
, h¯
′
, η, j + 1)
∂a′
(22)
whereWG is the expected value of working-age households with a good history.
Proof. See Appendix D.
For each of the grid points for asset holdings a
′
for the next period, endogenous grid methods
computes the endogenously-driven current assets a(a
′
) by using the FOC in Proposition 2.7.1.
Note that since the endogenously-driven current assets a(a
′
) is located on an endogenous grid
of the current assets a, it is required to additionally compute the decision rule and values on the
exogenous grid. The monotonicity of decision rules and value functions allows endogenous grid
methods to use interpolations to compute those on the exogenous grid for the current assets a.
I modify this interpolation step as follows. For each of the grid points for asset holdings a
′
of which value is above zero, I use a linear interpolation as other endogenous grid methods do.
However, for each of the grid points for asset holdings a
′
whose value is below zero, I use the grid
search method to avoid potentially unstable solutions due to numerical errors in calculating the
derivative of loan rate schedules
∂q(a
′
,¯i
′
,h¯
′
;j,η)a
′
∂a
′ . Although Proposition 2.7.1 proves that these loan
rate schedules are differentiable, as Hatchondo, Martinez and Sapriza (2010) point out, the accu-
racy of solution is sensitive to how to compute the derivative of loan rate schedules
∂q(a
′
,¯i
′
,h¯
′
;j,η)a
′
∂a′
.
I use the grid search method only for asset holdings a
′
of which value is below zero. Despite the
inclusion of this grid search method, this hybrid method substantially reduces computational time
because the method does not search the whole range of the assets grid. This grid search is operated
only between the risky borrowing limit and zero assets. Moreover, using the monotonicity, I can
repeatedly narrow the range of the feasible set of solutions in grid search.
3 Calibration
I calibrate the model to capture cross-sectional and life-cycle features of the U.S. economy before
the Affordable Care Act (ACA), because the period of the ACA is too brief to be considered as
the steady state of the U.S. healthcare system. To reflect these features, I take information from
multiple micro data sets. In particular, I use the MEPS to capture salient cross-sectional and life-
cycle dimensions on the use of emergency rooms, medical conditions, and medical expenditures.16
To calibrate the model, I separate parameters into two groups. The first set of parameters is
determined outside the model. I choose the values of these parameters from the macroeconomic
16The details of the data selection process are provided in Appendix A.
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literature and policies. The other set of parameters requires solving the stationary distribution of
the model to minimize the distance between moments generated by the model and their empirical
counterparts. Table 1 shows the values of parameters resulting from the calibration, Table 2 sum-
marizes the targeted aggregate moments and the corresponding moments generated by the model,
and Figure 3 shows the targeted life-cycle moments and the corresponding model-generated mo-
ments.
Table 1: Benchmark Parameter Values
Parameter Description Internal Value
Demographics
J0 Initial age N 23
Jr Retirement age N 65
J¯ Maximum length of life N 100
πn Population growth rate (percent) N 1.2%
Preferences
λu Weight on consumption Y 0.601
v Elasticity of substitution b.w c and hc Y 0.329
σ Risk aversion N 3 (De Nardi, French and Jones (2010))
β Discount factor Y 0.790
Labor Income
ω¯j Deterministic life-cycle profile N {0.0905,-0.0016}
∗
φh Elasticity of labor income to health status N 0.594
ρη Persistence of labor productivity shocks Y 0.847
σǫ Standard deviation of persistent shocks Y 0.556
Health Technology
κe Scale of ER health shocks Y 0.310
Ajg Age group effect on ER health shocks Y {1, 1.338, 1.452, 1.591, 1.546, 1.687}
pse Probability of drastic ER health shocks N 0.2
κn Scale of non-ER health shocks Y 0.019
αn Dispersion of non-ER health shocks Y 0.543
Bjg Age group effect of non-ER health shock Y {1, 0.710, 0.458, 0.295, 0.180, 0.012}
ψjg Efficiency of health technology Y {0.465, 0.430, 0.497, 0.567, 0.533, 0.302}
ϕjg Curvature of health technology Y {0.314, 0.221, 0.259, 0.263, 0.393, 0.728}
Survival Probability
Γjg Age group effect on survival rate Y {0.004, 0.01, 0.02, 0.026, 0.113, 0.221, 0.574}
ν Elasticity of survival rate to health status N 0.226 (Franks, Gold and Fiscella (2003))
Health Insurance
y¯ Income threshold for Medicaid eligibility Y 0.043
(qnMCD, q
e
MCD) Medicaid coverage rates N (0.7,0.8)
(qnIHI , q
e
IHI) IHI coverage rates N (0.55,0.7)
(qnEHI , q
e
EHI) EHI coverage rates N (0.7,0.8)
(qnmed, q
e
med) Medicare coverage rates N (0.55,0.75)
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Table 1 continued from previous page
Parameter Description Internal Value
pmed Medicaid premium N 0.021
p(EHI|η) EHI offer rate N Appendix H
ψEHI Subsidy for EHI N 0.8
ξIHI Markup for IHI Y 1
ξEHI Markup for EHI Y 1
Default
ξ Cost of having a bad credit history Y 0.390
λ 1/Duration of having a bad credit history N 0.333
ζ¯ Non-medical expense shocks ζ ∼ U [0, ζ¯] Y 0.033
Tax and Government
ss Social Security benefit N 0.256
τss Social Security tax Y 0.082
τmed Medicare payroll tax Y 0.051
G Government spending/ GDP N 0.18
a0 Upper bound of the progressive tax fnc N 0.258 (Gouveia and Strauss (1994))
a1 Curvature of the progressive tax fnc N 0.768 (Gouveia and Strauss (1994))
a2 Scale of the progressive tax fnc Y 1.257
τy Proportional tax rate Y 0.077
Firm
z Total factor productivity Y 0.557
θ Capital income share N 0.36
δ Depreciation rate N 0.24
Hospital
ζ Mark-up of hospital Y 1.040
The model period is triennial . One unit of output in the model is the U.S. GDP per capita in
2000 ($36, 245.5).
Demographics: The model period is triennial. Households enter the economy at age 23 and
retire at age 65. Since the mortality rate is endogenous, life spans differ across households. Their
maximum length of life is 100 years. These values correspond to Jr = 15 and J¯ = 26. The chosen
population growth rate πn is 1.2 percent, which is consistent with the annual population growth
rate in the U.S.
Preferences: Preferences are represented by a power utility function over a CES aggregator over
consumption and health status. λu is the weight of non-medical consumption on the CES aggrega-
tor in the utility function. λu is chosen to match the ratio of the total medical expenditures to output
of 0.163 in the National Health Expenditure Accounts (NHEA). v is the elasticity of substitution
between non-medical consumption and current health status, which is chosen to target the correla-
tion between non-medical consumption and medical expenditures, which is 0.153 in the PSID. The
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Table 2: Targeted Aggregate Moments
Moment Empirical value Model value
Risk-free interest rate (percent) 4 4
AVG of bankruptcy rates (percent) 1 1.1
Fraction of bankruptcy Filers with Medical Bills 0.62 0.64
Total medical expenditures/GDP 0.163 0.163
CV of medical expenditures 2.67 2.57
Corr b.w. consumption and medical expenditures 0.153 0.149
Autocorrelation of earnings shocks 0.952 0.953
STD of log earnings 1.29 1.25
Fraction of ER users aged b.w. 23 and 34 0.125 0.128
AVG of health shocks b.w. ages of 23 and 34 0.116 0.124
Individual health insurance take-up ratio 0.11 0.095
Employer-based health insurance take-up ratio 0.685 0.650
Working-age households’ Medicaid take-up ratio 0.044 0.044
The model period is triennial . I transform triennial moments into annual moments.
One unit of output in the model is the U.S. GDP per capita in 2000 ($36, 432.5).
value of v is 0.329, which implies that the marginal utility of non-medical consumption increases
with health status. This result is consistent with the empirical finding of Finkelstein, Luttmer and
Notowidigdo (2013). σ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, which is chosen by following
De Nardi, French and Jones (2010). β is the discount factor of households. It is chosen to match
an equilibrium risk-free interest rate of 4 percent.
Labor Income: To obtain the deterministic life-cycle profile of earnings ω¯j , I take the follow-
ing steps. First, in the MEPS, I choose the Physical Component Score (PCS) as the counterpart
of health status in the model.17 I normalize the PCS by dividing all of the observations by the
highest score in the sample. Second, exploiting the panel structure of the MEPS data, I regress
the difference in log labor income on differences in age squared, education, sex and the PCS.18 I
choose the summation of the age and age-squared terms as the deterministic life-cycle profiles of
earnings ω¯j . φh is set based on the estimate of the coefficient of the PCS. ρη is chosen to match
the autocorrelation of the idiosyncratic component φh log (hc)+ log (η) with the autocorrelation of
earnings shocks without the health component of 0.957 in Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004).
σǫ is chosen such that the model generates a standard deviation of 1.29 for the log earnings in the
Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) (Dı´az-Gime´nez, Glover and Rı´os-Rull (2011)).
17The PCS is a continuous health measure between 0 and 100 that indicates individual physical condition.
18This setting absorbs individual fixed effects. Further, one might be concerned about endogeneity issues due to
reverse causality from labor income to health, but empirical studies including Currie and Madrian (1999) and Deaton
(2003) show that it is difficult to find a direct effect of labor income on health.
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Figure 3: Targeted Life-cycle Moments
Health Technology: I choose the scale parameter of the function for emergency health shocks κe
to target the average fraction of emergency room users aged between 23 and 34, which is 0.125 in
the MEPS. Ag governs differences in emergency room visits by age group. It is chosen to match
the ratio of the fraction of emergency room visits for each age group to that of households aged
between 23 and 34. The upper-right panel of Figure 3 shows that these ratios observed in data are
close to those generated by the model. pse is the probability of an extreme emergency medical event
conditional on the occurrence of an emergency medical event. I model these extreme emergency
medical events as emergency events that incur the top 20 percent of emergency medical expenses.
κn is chosen to target the average health shocks of households aged between 23 and 34, which
is 0.125 in the MEPS. αn determines the degree of differences in health shocks across levels of
health capital. It is selected to target the coefficient of variation of medical expenditures of 2.67
in the MEPS. Bjg is set to match the ratio of the average of medical conditions transformed by
health shocks for each age group to that of households aged between 23 and 34. The lower-left
panel of Figure 3 shows that the model generates a similar age profile of medical conditions. ψjg
is set to match the average of medical expenditures for each age group. ϕjg is chosen to target the
standard deviation of medical expenditures for each age group. The upper-left and upper-middle
panels of Figure 3 show that the life-cycle profiles of the mean and standard deviation for medical
expenditures in the data are close to those generated by the model.
Survival Probability: Γjg controls the disparities in survival rates across age groups. Γjg is cho-
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sen to target the average survival rate for each age group, which is calculated based on Bell and
Miller (2005). ν governs the predictability of the PCS for the survival rate. I choose ν based on
the estimate of Franks, Gold and Fiscella (2003). They use a somewhat different type of health
measure from the MEPS. Whereas the MEPS uses the SF-12 as its PCS, Franks, Gold and Fiscella
(2003) choose the SF-5 as their PCS. Although the types of PCS differ, Østhus, Preljevic, Sandvik,
Leivestad, Nordhus, Dammen and Os (2012); Lacson, Xu, Lin, Dean, Lazarus and Hakim (2010);
Rumsfeld, MaWhinney, McCarthy Jr, Shroyer, VillaNueva, O’brien, Moritz, Henderson, Grover,
Sethi et al. (1999) find that different types of PCS are highly correlated. Based on their finding,
I use the estimate of Franks, Gold and Fiscella (2003) by transforming their five-year result to a
three-year value and rescaling the 0-100 scale into the relative scale of the model. Recall that, in
the model, health status is represented by a health status relative to the healthiest in the economy.
Health Insurance: The income threshold for Medicaid eligibility y¯ is chosen to match the per-
centage of Medicaid takers among working-age households, which is 4.4 percent in the MEPS.
Health insurance coverage rates, qeMCD, q
e
IHI , q
e
EHI and q
e
med, (q
n
MCD, q
n
IHI , q
n
EHI and q
n
med), are
chosen to match the fraction of (non-) emergency out-of-pocket medical expenditures among the
total medical expenditures for each type of health insurance. The Medicare premium pmed is set to
2.11 percent of GDP per capita, which is based on the finding in Jeske and Kitao (2009). The offer
rates of employer-based health insurance p(EHI|η) are set to target the offer rates across earn-
ings levels in the MEPS. Appendix H demonstrates the details. For each age group jg, I calculate
the conditional offer rates given a level of earnings in the data. Then, I map the offer rate in the
data onto the stationary distribution of earnings shocks in the model and calculate the conditional
offer rate p(EHI|η). The subsidy for employer-based health insurance ψEHI is chosen such that
employer-based health insurance takers pay 20 percent of the premium. ξIHI and ξEHI are set
to the take-up ratios of individual private health insurance and employer-based health insurance,
respectively.
Default: The cost of bad credit history ξ is chosen to match the average Chapter 7 bankruptcy rate
in Livshits, MacGee and Tertilt (2007). λ is chosen to match the average duration of exclusion,
which is 10 years for Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing.
Tax and Government: ss is chosen to match a replacement rate of 40 percent. Social Security
tax τss is chosen to balance the government budget for Social Security. τmed is set to balance the
government budget for Medicare. Non-medical government spending is set at 18 percent of U.S.
GDP. a0 and a1 are taken from Gouveia and Strauss (1994). As in Jeske and Kitao (2009) and
Pashchenko and Porapakkarm (2013), the scale parameter of the income tax function a2 is chosen
to match the fraction of tax revenue financed by progressive income taxation of 65 percent, which
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is the average value of the OECD member countries. The proportional income tax τy is chosen to
balance the government budget constraint.
Firm: TFP z is chosen to normalize output to 1. θ is chosen to reproduce the empirical finding
that the share of capital income is 0.36. Annual depreciation rate δ is 8 percent.
Hospital: Hospital mark-up ζ is chosen to represent the zero profit condition of the hospital.
3.1 Model Performance
Before conducting a series of counterfactual experiments for the three healthcare reforms, I demon-
strate the performance of the model by assessing the consistency of the untargeted results of the
model with their empirical counterparts.
Life-cycle Dimensions: Figure 4 depicts the life-cycle profiles of average consumption, earnings
and assets. The shape of the consumption profile is concave and relatively flatter than the other
two profiles. Earnings profiles increase until the mid-40s and decline until retirement. After retire-
ment, households receive Social Security benefits. Households save assets until their retirements
and spend them afterward. The shape of the three profiles resembles that of their empirical coun-
terparts, which are documented in Heathcote, Perri and Violante (2010) and Dı´az-Gime´nez, Glover
and Rı´os-Rull (2011).
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Figure 4: Age Profiles of Consumption, Earnings and Assets
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Figure 5: Age Profiles of Bankruptcy Filings (Source: Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook (2001))
Figure 5 displays the profiles of the fraction of bankruptcy filings over the life-cycle. In the
data, the life-cycle profile of bankruptcy filings is hump-shaped, and bankruptcy filers aged be-
tween 25 and 44 consist of more than half of the total bankruptcy filers. The model broadly
reproduces these features well, meaning that it successfully reflects how default risks evolve over
the life-cycle.
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Figure 6: Age Profiles of Insurance Take-up Ratios
Figure 6 shows the age profiles of take-up ratios for health insurance. These take-up ratios in
the model are broadly similar to those in the data. Before the expansion of Medicaid under the
ACA, only a small portion of working-age households used Medicaid, as it was available only
to low-income households. The model generates this feature well. Regarding individual health
insurance, the model reproduces the life-cycle profile for those aged between 23 and 55 well.
However, the model does not match the empirical rise in its take-up ratio for those aged between
56 and 64 because the model cannot capture early retirement. In the data, those who take early
retirement tend to purchase individual health insurance until they reach the Medicare eligibility
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age. Since all households in the model are required to retire at age 65, the model fails to reproduce
this. The model succeeds in generating the hump-shaped age profiles in employer-based health
insurance in the data, which implies that the model, overall, reflects life-cycle features of health
insurance behaviors well .
Table 3: Untargeted Cross-sectional Moments
Moment Empirical Value Model Value
Debt - earnings Ratio 0.084 0.074
Correlation b.w. Income and ER Visits -0.09 -0.14
Correlation b.w. Income and Medical Conditions -0.15 -0.27
The model period is triennial . I transform the triennial moments into annual mo-
ments.
Cross-sectional Dimensions: Table 3 shows cross-sectional moments that are not explicitly tar-
geted. The empirical values of these moments are obtained from previous studies and the data.
Empirical values for the debt to earnings ratio is from Livshits, MacGee and Tertilt (2007). The
debt to earnings ratio is 8.4 percent in the data, which is 7.4 percent in the model. The model also
generate reasonable values on health-related cross-sectional moments. The empirical values of
these health-related moments below are from the MEPS. The model generates negative values of
the correlation between income and emergency room visits and of the correlation between income
and medical conditions quantified to health shocks. Note that the negative correlation values can
be reproduced owing to the model’s setting for the distribution of health shocks: the likelihood of
emergency and non-emergency health shocks negatively depends on health capital.
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Figure 7: Bottom and Top End of the Emergency Room Usage Distribution
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Figure 7 implies that the model endogenously captures the features of emergency room usage
of low-income individuals and high-income individuals. The left panel of Figure 7 shows that,
in the data, low-income individuals visit emergency rooms more frequently over the life-cycle,
which is well-replicated in the model. Note that the fraction differs across income levels, as the
distribution of emergency health shocks depends on health capital. If the distribution depended
only on age, there would be no difference in visits to emergency rooms across income groups.
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Figure 8: Bottom and Top End of the Medical Conditions Distribution
Figure 8 compares the age profiles of medical conditions between individuals in the top 20
percent of income and those in the bottom 20 percent. It implies that the model captures the distri-
butional features of medical conditions across income groups. The left panel of Figure 8 implies
that low-income individuals tend to suffer from more severe health shocks than high-income indi-
viduals, which is presented in the model’s result. These successes of the model make it possible
to capture asymmetric financial risks across income groups, as health risks are linked to financial
risks via emergency and non-emergency medical expenses.
4 Results
4.1 Health Insurance Policy and Social Welfare Function
All health insurance policies in this study address the reforms of two types of health insurance
for non-retirees: Medicaid (public health insurance for non-retirees) and private individual health
insurance (IHI). The ideal target is to characterize a complete set of healthcare reforms that max-
imizes social welfare. However, healthcare reforms in the U.S. include a large number of policy
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components that affect a wide range of agents.19 I put my focus mainly on policy components
related to households. In addition, in all policy experiments going forward, I preserve the system
of employ-based health insurance in the baseline economy because healthcare reforms proposed
in the U.S. have mainly addressed policies of Medicaid and IHI.
Specifically, my goal is to find the optimal design of three objects: (i) the eligibility rule of
Medicaid, (ii) the subsidy rule for the purchase of IHI, and (iii) the reform of the IHI market on
its pricing rule, pIHI , and coverage rates, (q
e
IHI , q
n
IHI). Ideally, one would impose no restrictions
on the objects the government can select. Unfortunately, optimizing such unrestricted objects is
computationally unfeasible. Therefore, first, I represent (i) the eligibility rule for Medicaid and (ii)
the subsidy rule for the purchase of IHI in one function with a two-parameter family. The subsidy
function of Medicaid and IHI is given by
Φ(y, i; M¯, ap) =


1 if y ≤ M¯ & i = MCD
− 1
ap
· y + 1
ap
· M¯ + 1 if M¯ < y ≤ M¯ + ap & i = IHI
0 otherwise
(23)
where Φ(y, i; M¯, ap) is the proportion of subsidy on the premium of health insurance i given to
households whose income is y. M¯ is the income threshold for Medicaid eligibility, and ap is the
income threshold of the subsidy for the purchase of IHI. For example, if a household earns income
lower than the income eligibility of MedicaidM , this household can use Medicaid. If a household
is between M¯ and M¯ + ap, this household is not eligible for Medicaid, but it can receive a subsidy
for the purchase of IHI as much as a fraction −1/ap · y + 1/ap · M¯ + 1 of the health insurance
premium. Note that when ap increases, the subsidy covers more households with larger benefits.
I define the IHI market reform as follows:
Π(bp) = (pIHI , q
n
IHI , q
e
IHI) =

(pIHI(hc, jg), 0.55, 0.7) if bp = 0(pIHI(jg), 0.70, 0.8) if bp = 1 (24)
whereΠ(bp) is a vector of the pricing rule for IHI pIHI , the coverage rate for non-medical expenses
qnIHI , and that of emergency medical expenses q
e
IHI conditional on a reform of bp. bp = 0 implies
no reform in the IHI market. Thus, the premium of IHI depends on the current health status hc
as well as age group jg, and its coverage rates (q
n
IHI , q
E
IHI) are lower than those of Medicaid and
employer-based health insurance. bp = 1 implies that the premium depends only on age group
jg and that the coverage rates, (q
e
IHI , q
n
IHI), improve to be the same as the EHI and Medicaid’s
19For example, policies in the Affordable Care Act reach the health insurance industry, household, firm and govern-
ment sectors.
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coverage rate.
The above setting is so flexible that the functions allow me to replicate not only pre-existing
healthcare systems around the world but also alternative healthcare reforms recently proposed in
the U.S. For example, if M¯ is larger than the income of a household whose income is the highest,
this policy implies a universal healthcare system (single-payer healthcare system). Additionally,
by choosing bp = 1 and adjusting M¯ and ap properly, it is possible to mimic the Medicaid ex-
pansion and the progressive subsidies for the purchase of individual health insurance of the ACA.
Furthermore, if one chooses bp = 0 and establishes lower values of M¯ and ap than those of the
ACA, he can mimic the policies of the American Health Care Act. The parameterization of health-
care reform permits us to avoid restricting the scope of this study to specific reforms. Rather, this
flexibility makes it possible to explore more general features of health insurance policies, which
allows the characterization of optimal health insurance policies.
Healthcare reforms can be represented by three parameters (M¯, ap, bp). An issue is that differ-
ent healthcare reforms require different levels of tax revenues because the reforms are funded by
taxes. I adjust a0 of the income tax function , a0{y− (y
−a1 + a2)
−1/a1}+ τy y, to balance the gov-
ernment budget while preserving the values of a1, a2 and τy in the baseline economy. Recall that
a0 determines the upper bound of the progressive tax as income y goes to infinity. Therefore, the
higher a0, the more progressive the tax system. As noted in Pashchenko and Porapakkarm (2013),
this setting takes into account that more redistributive healthcare reforms require more progressive
income taxes.
The government maximizes a social welfare function (SWF). The SWF values the ex-ante
lifetime utility of an agent born into the stationary equilibrium implied by the chosen healthcare
reform. The government solves
max
M¯≥0,ap≥0,bp∈{0,1}
SWF (M¯, ap, bp) (25)
such that
SWF (M¯, ap, bp) =
∫
V Gj=23(s0; M¯, ap, bp)µ(ds0, j = 23; M¯, ap, bp)
s0 = (a = 0, i = i0, h = h0, ǫe, ǫn, η, ζ, ω)
(23) and (24).
where V Gj=23(·; M¯, ap, bp) is the value of households at age 23 associated with (M¯, ap, bp), µ(·; j =
23; M¯, ap, bp) is the distribution over households at age 23 associated with (M¯, ap, bp). Recall that
all newborn households start with zero assets and the maximum level of health capital stock. The
initial distribution of health insurance status is obtained from the MEPS by computing the joint
distribution between earnings and health insurance status at age 23. I interpret that the level of
33
earnings in the MEPS reflects the level of labor productivity η. I assume that (ǫe, ǫn, η, ζ, ω) are on
their stationary distributions at age 23.
I quantify welfare changes from the baseline economy by computing the consumption equiva-
lent variation CEV in the following way:
J∑
j=1
∫
s
βj−1πj+1|j(hc,0(s, j))u((1 + CEV)c0(s, j), hc,0(s, j))µ0(ds, j) (26)
=
J∑
j=1
∫
s
βj−1πj+1|j(hc,1(s, j))u(c1(s, j), hc,1(s, j))µ1(ds, j)
where β is the discount rate, and πj+1|j(hc) is the rate of surviving up to age j + 1 conditional
survival up to age j with a current health status hc. The subscripts of these variables indicate the
economy concerned. A subscript of 0 means that the variables refer to the baseline economy and
that of 1 implies that the variables refer to an economy relative to the baseline economy.
4.2 Optimal Health Insurance Policy
Table 4: Optimal Policies and Welfare Changes
Variable Baseline Optimal
Health Insurance System (M¯, ap, bp) (0.04, 0, 0) (0.216, 10.42, 1)
Welfare Changes (CEV) – +6.48%
Table 4 shows the optimal health insurance system and its welfare change. The optimal health
insurance system is given by a threshold of the eligible income for Medicaid M¯ = 0.216, a pro-
gressive parameter of the subsidy for the purchase of IHI ap = 10.42, and the indicator of the IHI
market reform bp = 1. These imply that the threshold of eligible income for Medicaid is 21.6
percent (approximately $7,870) of the average income in the Baseline model ($36,432.5), the sub-
sidies for the purchase of IHI are given up to households whose income is between 21.6 percent
(approximately $7,870) and 1,042 percent (approximately $379,627) of the average income in the
baseline model ($36,432.5). Thus, all working-age populations will be eligible either for Medicaid
or for the subsidy for the purchase of the IHI. However, this does not mean that everyone receives
the same amount of benefits. When household’s income decreases by $1,000 in the interval above
M¯ = 0.216, the subsidy increases by 2.24 (1/10.42) percent of the health insurance premium. The
optimal health insurance policy implements the reform of the IHI market in (24). The optimal
health insurance policy improves welfare by 6.48 percent.
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4.2.1 Inspection of the Optimal Health Insurance Policy
Table 5: Health-Related Outcomes
Moment Baseline Optimal bp = 0 Low M¯ High M¯ Low ap High ap
Health Insurance System
M¯ (Medicaid Eligibility) 0.04 0.216 0.344 0.04 0.4 0.216 0.216
ap (Threshold for the IHI Subsidy) 0 10.42 0 10.42 10.42 0.2 50
bp (IHI Reform) 0 1 0 1 1 1 1
Health Insurance
Total Insurance Take-up Ratio 79% 97.9% 97.2% 97.9% 97.8% 95.9% 97.9%
Medicaid Take-up Ratio 4.4% 21.7% 36.6% 3.3% 37% 23.9% 21.7$
IHI Take-up Ratio 9.5% 57.7% 8.1% 79.2% 11.5% 13.3% 65.5%
IHI Premium/AVG Income** 6.3% 8.8% 6.6% 7.86% 10% 7.9% 9.8%
EHI Take-up Ratio 65.1% 18.5% 52.5% 15.4% 17.7% 58.7% 10.8%
EHI Premium/AVG Income** 9% 5 % 5.9% 9% 3.6% 7% 2.4%
Medical Expenditure
AVG Medical Exp.* 5898 6085 6004 6044 5996 5939 6037
CV of Medical Exp. 2.57 2.49 2.5 2.49 2.49 2.51 2.49
Health Measure
AVG Health 0.672 0.704 0.702 0.705 0.705 0.701 0.705
STD of Log Health 0.867 0.806 0.811 0.822 0.807 0.812 0.806
AVG Health Shocks 0.352 0.340 0.341 0.340 0.340 0.341 0.340
AVG Prob of ER Visits 0.130 0.119 0.120 0.120 0.119 0.119 0.120
Life Expectancy 74.9 75.02 75.01 75.02 75.02 75.01 75.02
Corr(Income, Health Measure)
Corr(Income, Health Shocks) -0.27 -0.229 -0.232 -0.228 -0.229 -0.233 -0.228
Corr(Income, ER Visits) -0.14 -0.120 -0.121 -0.120 -0.120 -0.122 -0.120
The model period is triennial . I transform the triennial moments into annual moments.
* Unit=U.S. dollar in 2000.
** The average income in the baseline economy.
Health-related Outcomes: Table 5 shows the health-related outcomes in economies with five
types of health insurance policies. The first and second columns represent results in the baseline
economy and the economy with the optimal health insurance policy, respectively. There are three
more columns to explore the implications of three policy parameters, (M¯, ap, bp). bp = 0 represents
the results of an economy where the eligibility rule for Medicaid M¯ and the rule of the subsidy for
the purchase of the IHI ap are the optimal while not reforming the IHI market. Low (High) M¯
represents the results for an economy of which M¯ is lower (higher) than that in the economy with
the optimal health insurance policy. Low (High) ap demonstrates results in an economy of which
ap is lower (higher) than that in the economy with the optimal health insurance policy.
‘Health Insurance System’ in ‘Optimal’ in Table 5 shows that the optimal health insurance pol-
icy expands health insurance coverage while changing the composition of health insurance. These
changes are driven by the expansion of Medicaid eligibility and the provision of the subsidy for
the purchase of IHI. The take-up ratio of health insurance increases by 19 percentage points. The
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take-up ratios of Medicaid and IHI increase by 17.3 percentage points and 48.2 percentage points,
respectively. However, these policies crowd out EHI by 46.6 percentage points. The premium of
IHI increases because the IHI market reform, bp, requires improving the coverage rates of the IHI,
(qnIHI , q
e
IHI). The optimal health insurance policy reduces EHI’s premium because the expansions
of the IHI and Medicaid give rise to a less risky pool of EHI.
‘Medical Expenditure’ in ‘Optimal’ in Table 5 demonstrates that these changes in health insur-
ance increase the average medical expenditure and decrease the inequality of medical spending.
The expansions of Medicaid and IHI allow low-income households to have more access to health-
care services by progressively reducing the effective prices of health insurance. This change causes
low-income households to increase medical spending, which increases the average level of medical
expenditure and decreases differences in medical spending between low- and high-income house-
holds. Furthermore, the optimal health insurance policy changes the timing of medical spending
over the life-cycle. ‘Optimal’ in Table 6 shows that the optimal health insurance policy increases
the average medical spending during the working-age period, while decreasing it for retired house-
holds. The optimal health insurance policy allows young households to have more access to health-
care services by lowering the effective prices of health insurance for them. This change makes the
slope of the life-cycle profile of medical spending flatter, which reduces inequality in medical
spending across age groups.
Table 6: Average Medical Expenditure by Age Group
Baseline Optimal bp = 0 Low M¯ High M¯ Low ap High ap
Age [0.04, 0, 0] [0.216, 10.24, 1] [0.344, 0, 0] [0.04, 10.42, 1] [0.4, 10.42, 1] [0.216, 0.2, 1] [0.216, 50, 1]
23-34 2,578 2,754 (+6.83) 2,730 (+5.9) 2,752 (+6.75) 2,754 (+6,83) 2,737 (+6.17) 2,752 (+6.75)
35-46 3,730 3,896 (+4.45) 3,838 (+2.9) 3,898 (+4.5) 3,897 (+4.48) 3,845 (+3.08) 3,897 (+4.48)
47-55 5,756 5,986 (+4) 5,892 (+2.36) 5,994 (+4.13) 5,990 (+4.07) 5,901 (+2.52) 5,995 (+4.15)
56-64 8,596 9,136 (+6.28) 8,835 (+2.78) 9,161 (+6.57) 9,135 (+6.27) 8,841 (+2.85) 9,160 (+6.56)
65-76 11,592 11,571 (-0.18) 11,511 (-0.7) 11,642 (+0.43) 11,512 (-0.69) 11,559 (-0.28) 11,598 (+0.05)
77-100 8,739 8,653 (-0.98) 8,665 (-0.85) 8,741 (+0.02) 8,564 (-2) 8,703 (-0.41) 8,653 (-0.98)
Unit=U.S. dollar in 2000.
The square brackets [] indicate the health insurance policy [M¯, ap, bp].
The parentheses () indicate % change from the baseline economy.
’Health Measure‘ in ‘Optimal’ in Table 5 shows that these changes in medical spending give
rise to improvements in overall health and reduced health inequality. As mentioned previously, the
optimal policy increases medical spending for young and low-income households. These changes
improve their health, and thereby reduce inequality in health. The optimal health increases the
average health status by 4.7 percent and decreases the standard deviation of the log of health
status by 7.3 percent. The average level of health shocks declines by 3.5 percent, and the average
probability of visiting emergency rooms decreases by 8.9 percent. The average life expectancy
increases by 0.12 years, and the correlations between income and adverse health measures such as
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health shocks and ER visits decline. ‘Optimal’ in Table 7 shows that the optimal policy improves
overall health for working-age households. The left graph of Figure 9 shows that the optimal health
insurance policy decreases inequality in health over the life-cycle, and this reduction is larger for
working-age households. Note that this enhanced health is a key driving force behind the welfare
improvement of the optimal health insurance policy.
Table 7: Average Health Status by Age Group
Baseline Optimal bp = 0 Low M¯ High M¯ Low ap High ap
Age [0.04, 0, 0] [0.216, 10.24, 1] [0.344, 0, 0] [0.04, 10.42, 1] [0.4, 10.42, 1] [0.216, 0.2, 1] [0.216, 50, 1]
23-34 0.864 0.875 (+1.27) 0.874 (+1.16) 0.875 (+1.27) 0.875 (+1.27) 0.874 (+1.16) 0.875 (+1.27)
35-46 0.759 0.805 (+6.06) 0.803 (+5.8) 0.805 (+6.06) 0.805 (+6.06) 0.803 (+5.8) 0.805 (+6.06)
47-55 0.671 0.725 (+8.05) 0.721 (+7.45) 0.725 (+8.05) 0.725 (+8.05) 0.721 (+7.45) 0.725 (+8.05)
56-64 0.577 0.624 (+8.15) 0.619 (+7.28) 0.624 (+8.15) 0.624 (+8.15) 0.617 (+6.93) 0.624 (+8.15)
65-76 0.436 0.458 (+5.05) 0.454 (+4.13) 0.458 (+5.05) 0.458 (+5.05) 0.452 (+3.67) 0.458 (+5.05)
77-100 0.184 0.185 (+0.54) 0.185 (+0.54) 0.186 (+1.09) 0.184 (0) 0.185 (+0.54) 0.185 (+0.54)
Unit=U.S. dollar in 2000.
The square brackets [] indicate the health insurance policy [M¯, ap, bp].
The parentheses () indicate % change from the baseline economy.
‘Health Insurance’ in the last five columns in Table 5 shows that the composition of health
insurance varies substantially across health insurance policies. ‘bp = 0’ implies that without the
reform of the IHI market, the optimal policy increases the take-up ratio of Medicaid by 32.2 per-
centage points while crowding out EHI by 12.6 percentage points. The premium of EHI falls
because expanding Medicaid causes the composition of the pool of EHI to be less risky. ‘Low M¯ ’
and ‘High M¯ ’ show that the income threshold of eligibility for Medicaid M¯ determines the take-up
ratio of Medicaid. The premium of EHI in ‘Low M¯ ’ is higher than that in ‘High M¯ ’ because the
expansion of Medicaid absorbs riskier households and makes the pool of EHI less risky. ‘Low ap’
and ‘High ap’ show that the income threshold of the subsidy for the purchase of IHI ap decides the
composition between IHI and EHI. In these two economies, there is little difference in the take-up
ratio of Medicaid, whereas the take-up ratios of EHI and IHI substantially differ. As ap increases,
IHI premium increases, and that of EHI decreases because IHI pool becomes riskier.
bp = 0 of Table 5 shows that whether to reform the IHI market has crucial impacts on the
optimal composition of health insurance. In this economy, preserving the EHI market is optimal.
This result is related to properties of EHI. As Jeske and Kitao (2009) noted, in terms of welfare,
EHI is costly because it has a number of regressive policy components. The EHI tends to be
offered to high-income individuals and give tax deductions to high-income individuals. However,
EHI is good for welfare because this health insurance maintains a large pool of the risk-sharing
channel. Without the reform of the IHI market, IHI cannot replace the risk-sharing channel of EHI.
Therefore, not subsidizing the IHI market is optimal. Rather, insuring risks in health through public
health insurance - that is, Medicaid - is better for welfare when the IHI reform is not implemented.
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Figure 9: Change in the STD of the Log Health Status from the Baseline Economy
Although Medicaid crowds out EHI, the magnitude is relatively small because EHI still plays a
substantial role in sharing health risks.
The last four columns of Table 5 show that when the reform of the IHI market is implemented,
the total take-up ratio of health insurance is a key determinant of health outcomes. Although
‘Optimal’, ‘Low M¯ ’, ‘High M¯ ’, and ‘High ap’ substantially differ in their composition of health
insurance, there is little difference in their health outcomes in ‘Health Measure’ because those
economies implement the reform of the IHI market, which improves the coverage rates of IHI up
to those of Medicaid and EHI. Because the pricing rules are different across health insurance types,
outcomes related to health insurance are heterogeneous across economies. However, the effects of
those health insurance types on health outcomes are similar across those economies because their
total take-up ratios of health insurance are similar and the coverage rates of IHI are the same as
those of Medicaid and EHI. Table 7 shows that medical spending behavior over the life-cycle is
similar across those four economies. Table 8 and the right panel of Figure 9 imply that those four
economies generate similar life-cycle patterns for health status and inequality in health.
Macroeconomic Outcomes: Table 8 implies that macroeconomic variables closely interact with
health insurance policies. Compared to the baseline economy, all these health insurance policies
cause the same directions of changes in macroeconomic variables. Output and consumption in-
crease, while the ratio of capital to output and inequality in consumption decrease. These changes
imply that these health insurance policies cause households to save less and consume more than
the case of the baseline economy. Two forces cause this reduction in savings. First, to finance
these healthcare reforms, taxes must be levied on incomes. This rise in income taxes reduces the
after-tax return on savings, which causes individuals to save less. Second, these policies reduce
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precautionary savings by improving health, which reduces the overall levels of health shocks, as
shown in Table 5. The increase in output is caused by an increase in the average efficiency units of
labor. Those health insurance policies improve overall health status, leading to an increase in over-
all levels of labor productivity. These changes bring about more income while reducing savings,
thereby leading to an increase in average consumption.
Table 8: Macroeconomic Outcomes
Baseline Optimal bp = 0 Low M¯ High M¯ Low ap High ap
Moment [0.04, 0, 0] [0.216, 10.24, 1] [0.344, 0, 0] [0.04, 10.42, 1] [0.4, 10.42, 1] [0.216, 0.2, 1] [0.216, 50, 1]
Output 1* 1.012 (+1.2) 1.011 (+1.1) 1.011 (+1.1) 1.012 (+1.2) 1.013 (+1.3) 1.009 (+0.9)
Capital/Output 2.96 2.924 (-1.22) 2.93 (-1.01) 2.92 (-1.35) 2.93 (-1.04) 2.94 (-0.68) 2.91 (-1.69)
AVG of Cons 0.362 0.369 (+1.93) 0.366 (+1.1) 0.371 (+2.49) 0.368 (+1.66) 0.367 (+1.38) 0.369 (+1.93)
STD of Log Cons 0.875 0.821 (-6.17) 0.822 (-6.06) 0.822 (-6.06) 0.819 (-6.4) 0.826 (-5.6) 0.821 (-6.17)
Units of Eff Labor 2.331 2.377 (+1.97) 2.373 (+1.8) 2.377 (+1.97) 2.377 (+1.97) 2.373 (+1.8) 2.377 (+1.97)
STD of Log Earns 1.253 1.215 (-3.03) 1.217 (-2.87) 1.215 (-3.03) 1.215 (-3.03) 1.217 (-2.87) 1.215 (-3.03)
Gini COEF of Earns 0.589 0.580 (-1.53) 0.580 (-1.53) 0.580 (-1.53) 0.580 (-1.53) 0.581 (-1.36) 0.580 (-1.53)
AVG Tax Rate 22% 23.5% (+6.86) 23% (+4.73) 23.4% (+8.05) 23.8% (+8.05) 22.8% (+3.77) 23.9% (+8.41)
* I normalize the output value in the benchmark model to 1.
The square brackets [] indicate the health insurance policy [M¯, ap, bp].
The parentheses () indicate % change from the baseline economy.
Figure 10 shows how the policy parameters, (M¯, ap, bp), affect the levels of consumption over
the life-cycle. Compared to the baseline economy, all of these health insurance policies generate
two qualitatively similar changes in the consumption profiles. First, these health insurance policies
reduce older households’ consumption because the elderly have to pay more taxes to finance these
health insurance policies and because benefits from those policies are given only to working-age
households. Second, these policies increase consumption for working-age households. As noted
in Table 8, improvements in health following those policies lead to an increase in earnings.
The magnitude of changes in consumption depends on the values of policy parameters,
(M¯, ap, bp). The right panel of Figure 10 suggests that the reform of the IHI market plays a quanti-
tatively important role in increasing consumption for working-age households. As Table 5 shows,
without the reform of the IHI market, the insurance take-up ratio is less than that in the case of op-
timal health insurance. Thus, the optimal policy with no reform in the IHI market improves health
less than the optimal health insurance policy with the reform of the IHI market. Because health
affects earnings, the policy without the reform of the IHI generates less income for working-age
households than the optimal health insurance policy, which results in the difference in consumption
for working-age households. The economy with the policy without the reform of the IHI market
has higher levels of consumption for retired households than that with the optimal policy because
taxes are lower in the economy with no reform of the IHI market.
The middle panel of Figure 10 implies that how these redistributive health insurance policies
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Figure 10: Changes of the AVG Consumption from the Baseline Economy
affect the levels of consumption over the life-cycle. Recall that, as Table 5 shows, the total take-up
ratios of health insurance are almost the same across these economies, and thereby their health-
related outcomes are very similar. However, they have a substantial difference in the composition
of health insurance. Compared to the case of ‘High M¯ ’, households in the case of ‘Low M¯ ’ are
more likely to use IHI with the subsidy for its purchase and less likely to use Medicaid. Because
this subsidy covers a part of the IHI premium, burdens from taxes are less heavy in the economy
with ‘Low M¯ ’ than in that with ‘High M¯ ’. This difference in the way of financing health insurance
creates this gap in consumption between ‘Low M¯ ’ and ‘High M¯ ’.
The right panel of Figure 10 shows the above two implications at the same time. Similar to the
case of ‘bp = 0’, the economy with ‘Low ap’ has a lower take-up ratio of health insurance and a
lower level of the average health status than the economy with the optimal health insurance policy.
This deters labor income for working-age households from increasing to the level in the economy
with the optimal policy, which leads to the difference in consumption. The economy with ‘High
ap’ puts more resources on health than the economy with the optimal health insurance. As Table 5
shows, this additional input has little impact on health while increasing the average income taxes.
Thus, compared to the economy with the optimal health insurance policy, there is little difference
in the levels of consumption for working-age households, whereas overall levels of consumption
for old households are lower in the case of ‘High ap due to heavier taxes.
Figure 11 shows how the policy components, (M¯, ap, bp) have impacts on consumption in-
equality over the life-cycle. The left and right panels of Figure 11 imply that consumption inequal-
ity is positively related to health inequality. Table 5 shows that, compared to the economy with the
optimal health insurance policy, the economy with ‘bp = 0’ and that with ‘Low ap’ have higher
levels of the standard deviation of the log of health. This means that their earnings inequality is
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Figure 11: Changes in the STD of the Log of Consumption from the Baseline Economy
also higher, which is linked to higher inequality in consumption. The middle panel of Figure 11
shows how these redistributive health insurance policies affect consumption inequality. Compared
to the case of ‘Low M¯,households in the economy with ‘High M¯ ’ are less likely to pay a part of
IHI premium and more likely to use Medicaid with no premium. Thus, low-income households in
the economy with ‘High M¯ ’ can afford to allocate more income to consumption, which leads to
lower inequality in consumption.
Financial Consequences: Table 9 reports the financial consequences of these health insurance
policies. All healthcare reforms decrease overall bankruptcies, bankruptcies with medical bills,
and defaults on emergency medical bills. The magnitude of these reductions is positively related
to the total take-up ratio of health insurance. As mentioned previously, these healthcare reforms
allow households to increase medical spending in the early phases of the life-cycle and low-income
households to increase their spending on healthcare. This medical spending smoothing increases
overall health capital and decreases health inequality. These changes in the evolution of health mit-
igate the correlation between income and health risks, as the distribution of health risks depends on
the level of health capital. This phenomenon implies that these healthcare reforms lead young and
low-income individuals to face less severe medical conditions and reduce their frequency of emer-
gency room visits, thereby reducing overall levels of financial risks for these groups of households.
This reduction in financial risks decreases defaults on ER bills and bankruptcies. These healthcare
reforms decrease hospitals’ mark-up because the amount of unpaid medical bills declines.
Table 9 shows that all these health insurance policies decrease overall debt because these poli-
cies decrease the demand for debts from medical reasons. These health insurance policies increase
the risk-free interest rate because of general equilibrium effects. As mentioned previously, more
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Table 9: Financial Outcomes
Baseline Optimal bp = 0 Low M¯ High M¯ Low ap High ap
Moment [0.04, 0, 0] [0.216, 10.24, 1] [0.344, 0, 0] [0.04, 10.42, 1] [0.4, 10.42, 1] [0.216, 0.2, 1] [0.216, 50, 1]
AVG B.K. Rate 1.09% 0.91% (-16.5) 0.91% (-16.5) 0.9% (-17.4) 0.9% (-17.4) 0.9% (-17.4) 0.9% (-17.4)
% of B.K. with Med Bills 64% 56.9% (-11.1) 56.9% (-11.9) 56.4 (-11.9) 56.4% (-11.9) 57.4% (-10.3) 56.4% (-11.9)
Default Rate on ER Exp. 3.2% 2.01% (-37.2) 2.01% (-37.2) 1.99% (-37.8) 1.98% (-38.1) 2.03% (-36.6) 1.99% (-37.8)
Hospital’s Mark-up 1.04 1.026 (-1.35) 1.026 (-1.35) 1.025 (-1.44) 1.026 (-1.35) 1026 (-1.35) 1.025 (-1.44)
Risk-free Int. Rate 4% 4.14% (+3.5) 4.12% (+3) 4.17% (+4.3) 4.14% (+3.5) 4.08% (+2) 4.19% (+4.8)
AVG BOR. Int. Rate 17.9% 18.7% (+4.5) 17.9% (0) 18.7% (+4.5) 18.6% (+3.9) 16.2% (-9.5) 18.8% (+5)
AVG Default Premium 13.9% 14.6% (+5) 13.8% (-0.7) 14.6 (+5) 14.5% (+4.3) 12.1% (-13) 14.6% (+5)
AVG Debt* 1,669 1,415 (-15.2) 1,431 (-14.3) 1397 (-16.3) 1,392 (-16.6) 1,430 (-14.3) 1394 (-16.5)
The model period is triennial . I transform the triennial moments into annual moments.
The square brackets [] indicate the health insurance policy [M¯, ap, bp].
The parentheses () indicate % change from the baseline economy.
* Unit=U.S. dollar in 2000.
income taxes are levied to finance these health insurance policies, which decreases the after-tax
return on savings. This change decreases the aggregate supply of savings, which increases the
risk-free interest rate. The direction of changes in the average borrowing interest rate is not uni-
versal because the above two offsetting forces determine this rate. The reduced demand for debts
plays a role in raising the average borrowing interest rate, while the decrease in the aggregate sup-
ply of savings pushes up the average borrowing interest rate. The relative magnitude of these two
forces determines the average borrowing interest rate at equilibrium.
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Figure 12: Bankruptcies over the Life-cycle
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Figure 12 implies that the total take-up ratio is a key determinant of bankruptcy. The left panel
of Figure 12 compares economies whose take-up ratio of health insurance is different. Recall
that the take-up ratio of health insurance is the lowest in the baseline economy. As the take-up
ratio increases, bankruptcies decline over the life-cycle. The right panel of Figure 12 compares
economies whose take-up ratios are very close to one another. There is little difference across
those economies, which implies that the take-up ratio of health insurance is the key determinant of
bankruptcy. Figure 13 shows that the take-up ratio of health insurance is also the key determinant
of defaults on ER bills. The right panel of Figure 13 compares economies in which the take-up
ratios are different. The baseline economy generates the highest profiles of defaults on ER bills,
while the other economies, whose take-up ratios are lower, show much lower levels of defaults on
ER bills. The right panel of Figure 13 suggests that when there is little difference in the take-up
ratios, defaults on ER bills are also very similar over the life-cycle.
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Figure 13: Defaults on ER Bills over the Life-cycle
4.2.2 Decomposition of the Welfare Change for the Optimal Health Insurance Policy
Welfare is determined by the level and distribution of consumption and health status because they
are the components of the utility function. Due to the monotonicity and concavity of the utility
function, the social welfare function (25) rises when the levels of consumption and health increase
and inequalities in consumption and health decrease. The aggregate outcomes and life-cycle pro-
files may not be enough to understand welfare implications because the optimal health insurance
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policy might alter the level and distribution of consumption and health in predicting different di-
rections of welfare changes. For example, Figure 11 indicates that this policy reduces inequality
in consumption within cohort, but Figure 10 implies that consumption inequality across genera-
tions can increase due to the decrease in consumption among retired households. Thus, following
Conesa et al. (2009), I decompose the CEV into four components: a component stemming from
the change in the level of consumption, that from the change in the distribution of consumption,
that from the change in the level of health, and that from the change in the distribution of health.20
Table 10 shows that changes in health are the main deriving forces behind the welfare im-
provement of the optimal health insurance policy. In particular, reduced health inequality plays the
largest role in improving welfare. Although both changes in the level and distribution of health
improve welfare, the contribution of the change in the distribution is more than seven times larger
than that in the level. Although the change in consumption improves welfare, the impact is much
20Conesa et al. (2009) decompose welfare changes into these four components by using a feature of the utility
function in their study: the utility function is homothetic with respect to consumption. Note that the utility function
in this study is homothetic not with respect to consumption but with respect to both consumption and health. To
decompose welfare changes, I modify the procedure in Conesa et al. (2009) as follows.
Regarding total change in welfare, I numerically compute CEV in (26). Let CEV 0c and CEV
0
h be defined as
V ((1 + CEV 0c )c0, (1 + CEV
0
c )h0) = V (c1, h0)
V ((1 + CEV 0h )c0, (1 + CEV
0
h )h0) = V (c0, h1).
Because the utility function is not homothetic with respect to consumption, the summation of CEV 0c and CEV
0
h is
not equal to CEV . I rescale them by defining CEVc and CEVh as follows:
CEVc =
CEV 0c
CEV 0c + CEV
0
h
× CEV
CEVh =
CEV 0h
CEV 0c + CEV
0
h
× CEV.
I further decompose CEV 0c into a level effect CEV
0
cl and a distributional effect CEV
0
cd as follows:
V ((1 + CEV 0cl)c0, (1 + CEV
0
cl)h0) = V (cˆ0, h0)
V ((1 + CEV 0cd)cˆ0, (1 + CEV
0
cd)h0) = V (c1, h0)
where cˆ0 =
C1
C0
c0 is the consumption allocation by rescaling the allocation c0 with the change in aggregate consump-
tion C1
C0
. Note that CEV 0c ≈ CEV
0
cl + CEV
0
cd, but this does not hold to CEVc. I define CEVcl and CEVcd as
follows:
CEVcl =
CEV 0cl
CEV 0c + CEV
0
h
× CEV
CEVcd =
CEV 0cd
CEV 0c + CEV
0
h
× CEV.
I take the same decomposition as that for health.
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Table 10: Decomposition of Welfare Change
Total Change +6.48
Consumption
Total +1.37
Level +1.97
Distribution -0.60
Health
Total +5.11
Level +0.60
Distribution +4.51
Unit = % change from the baseline
economy
smaller than that of health. As seen in Table 8 and Figure 10, the increase in the consumption
level improves welfare. However, the change in the distribution of consumption plays a role in
reducing welfare, which implies that the effect of the decrease in the level of consumption for old
households dominates the reduced consumption inequality within the cohort. This phenomenon
implies that reallocating health across households is the largest driving force behind the welfare
improvement of the optimal policy.
4.3 Comparison with an Economy with No Option to Default
I investigate the effects of the option to default on the optimal health insurance policy. To do so, I
take the following steps. First, following the literature, I turn off the option to default by imposing
a huge penalty on defaulting. Specifically, I restrict defaulting households to use only 1 percent of
their income.21 In this setting, households default only when their not-defaulting budget set is the
empty set. Second, I re-calibrate the model with the same targets as in the baseline economy with
the option to default. Finally, I find the optimal health insurance policy with no option to default
and compare this policy with the optimal health insurance policy in the economy with the option to
default. Note that in this economy, there is no borrowing because the level of the natural borrowing
limit is zero.
4.3.1 Re-calibration
Table 11 shows the parameter values of the economy with no option to default. Because I re-
calibrate only internally determined parameters, the values of parameters that are determined out-
side the model are the same as those in the case with the option to default. The values of the cal-
ibrated parameters differ between the economy with the option to default and that with no option
to default, which reflects how the option to default makes a difference in households’ behavior.
21One might consider not allowing the option to default mechanically without any penalty. This setting is not
feasible because the monotonicity of the expected value function does not hold around the default region.
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Table 11: Parameter Values of the Economy with No Option to Default
Parameter Description Internal Value
Demographics
J0 Initial age N 23
Jr Retirement age N 65
J¯ Maximum length of life N 100
πn Population growth rate (percent) N 1.2%
Preferences
λu Weight on consumption Y 0.487
v Elasticity of substitution b.w c and hc Y 0.382
σ Risk aversion N 3 (De Nardi, French and Jones (2010))
β Discount factor Y 0.719
Labor Income
ω¯j Deterministic life-cycle profile N {0.0905,-0.0016}
∗
φh Elasticity of labor income to health status N 0.594
ρη Persistence of labor productivity shocks Y 0.847
σǫ Standard deviation of persistent shocks Y 0.556
Health Technology
κe Scale of ER health shocks Y 0.293
Ajg Age group effect on ER health shocks Y {1, 1.410, 1.481, 1.623, 1.603, 1.791}
pse Probability of drastic ER health shocks N 0.2
κn Scale of non-ER health shocks Y 0.019
αn Dispersion of non-ER health shocks Y 0.542
Bjg Age group effect of non-ER health shock Y {1, 0.690, 0.468, 0.296, 0.161, 0.013}
ψjg Efficiency of health technology Y {0.453, 0.422, 0.487, 0.577, 0.533, 0.201}
ϕjg Curvature of health technology Y {0.326, 0.221, 0.260, 0.258, 0.392, 0.668}
Survival Probability
Γjg Age group effect on survival rate Y {0.004, 0.01, 0.016, 0.029, 0.113, 0.192, 0.554}
ν Elasticity of survival rate to health status N 0.226 (Franks, Gold and Fiscella (2003))
Health Insurance
y¯ Income threshold for Medicaid eligibility Y 0.070
(qnMCD, q
e
MCD) Medicaid coverage rates N (0.7,0.8)
(qnIHI , q
e
IHI) IHI coverage rates N (0.55,0.7)
(qnEHI , q
e
EHI) EHI coverage rates N (0.7,0.8)
(qnmed, q
e
med) Medicare coverage rates N (0.55,0.75)
pmed Medicaid premium N 0.021
p(EHI|η) EHI offer rate Y 0.9× p(EHI|η) of the Baseline
ψEHI Subsidy for EHI N 0.8
ξIHI Markup for IHI Y 2.80
ξEHI Markup for EHI Y 1
Default
ζ¯ Non-medical expense shocks ζ ∼ U [0, ζ¯] N 0.033
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Table 11 continued from previous page
Parameter Description Internal Value
Tax and Government
ss Social Security benefit N 0.256
τss Social Security tax Y 0.084
τmed Medicare payroll tax Y 0.046
G Government spending/ GDP N 0.18
a0 Upper bound of the progressive tax fnc N 0.258 (Gouveia and Strauss (1994))
a1 Curvature of the progressive tax fnc N 0.768 (Gouveia and Strauss (1994))
a2 Scale of the progressive tax fnc Y 1.312
τy Proportional tax rate Y 0.097
Firm
z Total factor productivity N 0.557 (Baseline)
θ Capital income share N 0.36
δ Depreciation rate N 0.24
Hospital
ζ Mark-up of hospital Y 1.001
In the economy with no option to default, the value of the substitution elasticity between con-
sumption and health, ν, is larger than that in the baseline economy. This difference implies that
households with no option to default are more likely to substitute non-medical spending into med-
ical spending. Additionally, the value of β in the economy with no option to default is smaller
than that with the option to default. Because households with no option to default must insure all
health risks only through savings, they tend to save more than households with the option to de-
fault.22 Recall that in the economy with the option to default, the offer rate of the EHI, p(EHI|η),
is computed from the data. However, with no option to default, its scale is adjusted to 0.9. Without
any adjustment, the take-up ratio is approximately 75 percent in the model because all households
that receive the offer use EHI to insure health risks. To match this moment in the model with its
empirical counterpart, I calibrate the scale of the offer rate of the EHI. The mark-up of the hospital,
ζ , is much lower in the economy without the option to default because strategic defaults are not
allowed.
Table 12 reports the targeted aggregate moments in the economies with and without the option
to default. Overall moments are close across the data, in the economy with the option to default,
and in the economy without the option to default. Note that the average bankruptcy rate is not a
target in the economy without the option to default because any voluntary defaults are not allowed.
Because strategic default is not allowed in the economy without the option to default, the fraction of
bankruptcy filers with medical bills is also not targeted. Those two moments have positive values in
22Recall that in this economy, there is no sustainable borrowing constraint because the natural borrowing limit is
zero.
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Table 12: Targeted Aggregate Moments in the Economies with and without the Option to
Default
Moment Target w/ OPT DEF w/o OPT DEF
Risk-free interest rate (percent) 4 4 4
AVG of bankruptcy rate (percent) 1 1.1 0.06*
Fraction of bankruptcy Filers with Medical Bills 0.62 0.64 1*
Total medical expenditures/GDP 0.163 0.163 0.165
CV of medical expenditures 2.67 2.57 2.53
Corr b.w. consumption and medical expenditures 0.153 0.153 0.153
Autocorrelation of earnings shocks 0.952 0.953 0.953
STD of log earnings 1.29 1.25 1.26
Fraction of ER users aged b.w. 23 and 34 0.125 0.128 0.124
AVG of health shocks b.w. ages of 23 and 34 0.116 0.124 0.124
Individual health insurance take-up ratio 0.11 0.095 0.104
Employer-based health insurance take-up ratio 0.685 0.650 0.654
Working-age households’ Medicaid take-up ratio 0.044 0.044 0.043
The model period is triennial . I transform triennial moments into annual moments.
* : They are not targeted because there is no option to default.
the economy without the option to default because there exist extreme cases where non-defaulting
households cannot have a positive consumption due to emergency bills and non-medical expense
shocks. Figure 14 displays the targeted life-cycle moments in the economies with and without
the option to default. Overall moments are close across the data, the economy with the option to
default and the economy with no option to default.
4.3.2 Comparison of the Optimal Health Insurance Policies with and without the Option to
Default
Table 13 implies that the option to default makes substantial differences in the features of optimal
health insurance policies. With no option to default, the optimal health insurance policy is very
close to the health insurance system in the baseline economy. When households cannot choose
to default, the income threshold for Medicaid eligibility is 0.07 in the baseline economy, while
it is 0.055 in the economy with the optimal policy. The optimal health insurance policy with no
option to default increases the income threshold of the subsidy for the purchase of the IHI by 0.053
without reforming the IHI market. As a result, the composition of health insurance is very similar
between the baseline economy and the economy with no option to default plus the optimal health
insurance. When the option to default is not available, the average and the dispersion of medical
expenditures are almost the same across the baseline economy and the economy with the optimal
policy. However, in the economy with the option to default, the optimal policy decreases inequality
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Figure 14: Targeted Life-cycle Moments in the Economies with and without the Option to Default
in medical spending more substantially.
Table 13: Optimal Health Insurance in the Economies with and without the Option to Default
Variable Baseline w/ OPT DEF w/o OPT DEF
Optimal Health Insurance (M¯, ap, bp) – (0.216, 10.42, 1) (0.055, 0.053, 0)
Total Insurance Take-up Ratio 80.2% 97.9% 80.8%
Medicaid Take-up Ratio 4.3% 21.7% 2.4%
IHI Take-up Ratio 10.4% 57.5% 12.5%
EHI Take-up Ratio 65.4% 18.5% 65.9%
Total Medical Expenditure/GDP 0.1671 0.1670 0.1669
CV of Medical Expenditure 2.53 2.49 2.52
Table 14 implies that each of the optimal health insurance policies has different driving forces
behind its welfare improvements through the status of the option to default. In the economy with
the option to default, changes in health are the main driving force behind improvements in welfare,
while without the option to default, changes in consumption take this role. With the option to
default, changes in health account for improvements in welfare by 5.11 percent, but with no option
to default, these changes increase welfare by 0.73 percent. This gap is largely attributable to the
difference in distributional changes in health. When the option to default is allowed, changes in the
distribution of health lead to improvements in welfare by 4.51 percent. However, with no option to
default, changes in the distribution of health under the optimal policy play a minor role in welfare
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changes, which improves welfare by 0.73 percent. Furthermore, changes in consumption play a
role in increasing welfare in both economies, but the source is different. In the economy with the
option to default, changes in the distribution of consumption reduce welfare, but in the economy
with no option to default, welfare gain stems from changes in both the level and distribution of
consumption.
Table 14: Decomposition of Welfare Changes by the Option to Default
w/ OPT DEF w/o OPT DEF
Total Change +6.48 +2.14
Consumption
Total +1.37 +1.41
Level +1.97 +0.53
Distribution -0.60 +0.88
Health
Total +5.11 +0.73
Level +0.60 0
Distribution +4.51 +0.73
Unit = Percentage change from each of the baseline economies.
To understand the mechanisms behind the difference in these welfare changes, Table 15 com-
pares changes in aggregate variables from each of the baseline economies. Table 15 implies that
whether the option to default is allowed brings about substantial differences in the effect of these
optimal health insurance policies on changes in health. The average health increases by 4.54 per-
cent in the economy with the option to default, while it increases by 0.9 percent in the economy
without the option to default. Furthermore, with the option to default, the optimal policy reduces
the standard deviation of the log of health by 7.28 percent, but the optimal policy without the op-
tion to default decreases it by 1.92 percent. These changes imply that different impacts of each of
the optimal health insurance policies cause the different welfare implications in Table 14.
This difference in health causes differences in aggregate outcomes. In the economy with the
option to default, the optimal health insurance policy increases output despite the reduced ratio
of capital to output because improved health enhances overall labor productivity. Although the
optimal policy with no option to default increases output, this is driven not only by improved
health but also by an increase in capital. The optimal policy increases capital because its reduced
threshold of income eligibility for Medicaid increases the precautionary motive for savings for
medical reasons. The standard deviation of the log of earnings decreases more in the optimal
policy with the option to default because the decrease in health inequality is larger in this case.
In both economies, each of the optimal health insurance policies increases the average level
of consumption, which contributes to improvements in welfare. One might be concerned that
the direction of changes in the inequality of consumption is inconsistent with welfare changes in
Table 14. However, as mentioned previously, welfare changes from the distributional change in
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Table 15: Changes of the Aggregate Variables from Each of the Baseline Economies
Optimal w/ OPT DEFOptimal w/o OPT DEFNon-optimal w/o OPT DEF
Moment [0.216, 10.24, 1] [0.055, 0.053, 0] [0.216, 10.24, 1]
Output +1.2 +1 -13.3
Capital/Output -1.22 +1.22 -36.2
AVG of Cons +1.93 +0.52 -19.59
STD of Log Cons -6.17 +1.91 -12.93
AVG of Health +4.54 +0.9 -1.77
STD of Log Health -7.28 -1.92 -0.76
Units of Eff Labor +1.97 +0.32 -0.34
STD of Log Earns -3.03 -0.34 -0.76
AVG Tax Rate +6.86 +0.38 +18.31
‘Optimal w/ OPT DEF’ represents the results of the optimal health insurance policy in the economy with the
option to default. ‘Optimal w/o OPT DEF’ demonstrates the results of the optimal policy in the economy without
the option to default. ‘Non-optimal w/o OPT DEF’ displays the results for the economy without the option to
default while implementing the optimal health insurance policy for the economy with the option to default.
The square brackets [] indicate the health insurance policy [M¯, ap, bp].
Unit = Percentage change from each of the baseline economies.
consumption are relevant not only to the dispersion within age groups but also to the curvature
of the consumption life-cycle The details will be addressed again with the life-cycle profiles of
consumption.
‘Non-optimal w/o OPT DEF’ shows that the optimal policy in the economy with the option to
default cannot bring improvements in health if the option to default is not allowed. Rather, this
policy deteriorates overall health status. This policy decreases the average income by reducing the
aggregate stock of capital. This reduced capital is caused by a decrease in the after-tax return on
savings to finance this health insurance policy without improvements in health. This reduction in
income decreases consumption and medical spending, thereby causing worse health outcomes.
Table 16: Changes in the Average Medical Expenditure from Each of the Baseline Economies
Optimal w/ OPT DEF Optimal w/o OPT DEF Non-optimal w/o OPT DEF
Age [0.216, 10.24, 1] [0.055, 0.053, 0] [0.216, 10.24, 1]
23-34 +6.83 +1.01 -1.63
35-46 +4.45 +0.02 -1.49
47-55 +4 +0.78 -6.97
56-64 +6.28 +1.82 -16.15
65-76 -0.18 +0.89 -21.68
77-100 -0.98 +0.58 -25.14
‘Optimal w/ OPT DEF’ represents the results of the optimal health insurance policy in the economy
with the option to default. ‘Optimal w/o OPT DEF’ demonstrates the results of the optimal policy in
the economy without the option to default. ‘Non-optimal w/o OPT DEF’ displays the results for the
economy without the option to default while implementing the optimal health insurance policy for the
economy with the option to default.
The square brackets [] indicate the health insurance policy [M¯, ap, bp].
Unit = Percentage change from each of the baseline economies.
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Table 16 implies that in the economy with the option to default, the optional health insurance
policy increases medical spending for working-age households more than the optimal policy in the
economy with no option to default does. In addition, Table 17 shows that in the economy with the
option to default, the optimal health insurance policy reduces inequality in medical spending within
age groups more than the optimal policy in the economy without the option to default does. ‘Non-
optimal w/o OPT DEF’ shows that in the economy without the option to default, the optimal health
insurance policy in the economy with the option to default cannot bring such changes in medical
spending for working-age households. Rather, this policy reduces medical spending because of
the reduction in the average income due to a decrease in capital from more taxes and general
equilibrium effects.
Table 17: Changes in the Coefficient of Variation for Medical Expenditures from Each of the
Baseline Economies
Optimal w/ OPT DEF Optimal w/o OPT DEF Non-optimal w/o OPT DEF
Age [0.216, 10.24, 1] [0.055, 0.053, 0] [0.216, 10.24, 1]
23-34 -3.78 -0.3 -2.54
35-46 -4 +0.04 -10.16
47-55 -3.5 -0.19 -6.79
56-64 -4.15 -0.97 +1.84
65-76 -0.87 -0.6 +4.73
77-100 -1.34 -1.13 +1.15
‘Optimal w/ OPT DEF’ represents the results of the optimal health insurance policy in the economy
with the option to default. ‘Optimal w/o OPT DEF’ demonstrates the results of the optimal policy in
the economy without the option to default. ‘Non-optimal w/o OPT DEF’ displays the results for the
economy without the option to default while implementing the optimal health insurance policy for the
economy with the option to default.
The square brackets [] indicate the health insurance policy [M¯, ap, bp].
Unit = Percentage change from each of the baseline economies.
These differences in medical spending behavior mean that when the option to default is avail-
able, young and low-income households substantially rely on defaults and bankruptcies as implicit
health insurance. Thus, providing a more redistributive healthcare reform decreases the depen-
dence on this implicit health insurance by leading young and low-income households to increase
their spending on healthcare services. However, when the option to default is not available, even
in the baseline economy, these households look after their health more carefully through medical
spending because health risks would otherwise come as huge financial burdens over the life-cycle.
Therefore, the optimal health insurance requires less redistributive healthcare reform than the op-
timal policy in the case with the option to default.
Table 18 and Table 19 show that these differences in medical spending behavior cause different
evolutions in health over the life-cycle. Table 18 shows that when the option to default is available,
the optional health insurance policy improves health more than the optimal policy in the case
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Table 18: Changes in the Average Health Status for Each of the Baseline Economies
Optimal w/ OPT DEF Optimal w/o OPT DEF Non-optimal w/o OPT DEF
Age [0.216, 10.24, 1] [0.055, 0.053, 0] [0.216, 10.24, 1]
23-34 +1.27 -0.03 -2.28
35-46 +6.06 +1.37 -1.02
47-55 +8.05 +1.68 +1
56-64 +8.15 +1.78 -0.08
65-76 +5.05 +1.1 -7.14
77-100 +0.54 +0.49 -11
‘Optimal w/ OPT DEF’ represents the results of the optimal health insurance policy in the economy
with the option to default. ‘Optimal w/o OPT DEF’ demonstrates the results of the optimal policy in
the economy without the option to default. ‘Non-optimal w/o OPT DEF’ displays the results for the
economy without the option to default while implementing the optimal health insurance policy for the
economy with the option to default.
The square brackets [] indicate the health insurance policy [M¯, ap, bp].
Unit = Percentage change from each of the baseline economies.
without the option to default. In particular, with the option to default, the increase in medical
spending for working-age periods drives substantial improvements in health for retired households.
When the option to default is not available, the magnitude of improvements in health is weaker
over the life-cycle. Table 19 shows that each of the optimal health insurance policies reduces
health inequality over the life-cycle, but the magnitude is larger in the economy with the optimal.
As Table 17 presents, this gap is driven by the magnitude of the reduced inequality in medical
expenditure. The final columns of Table 18 and Table 19 show that when the optimal health
insurance with the option to default is implemented in the economy without the option to default,
this policy fails to improve health and reduce inequality in health because this policy does not
change households’ medical spending behavior to be preventative if the option to default is not
available.
Table 20 shows that each of the optimal health insurance policies leads to increases in the
levels of consumption over the life-cycle, and the magnitude is larger in the economy with the
option to default. Improvements in health increase overall levels of labor income because this
enhanced health increases the average labor productivity. This increase in labor income increases
overall levels of consumption over the life-cycle, and the magnitude of this force is larger in the
optimal policy with the option to default. The last column shows that when the optimal health
insurance with the option to default is implemented in the economy with no option to default,
overall consumption falls because of the reduction in the average income due to a drop in capital
from more taxes and general equilibrium effects.
Table 21 demonstrates that the optimal health insurance policy with the option to default re-
duces inequality in consumption for overall age groups, while the optimal policy with no option to
default increases inequality in consumption for working-age households. This gap arises because
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Table 19: Changes in the STD of the LOG of Health from Each of the Baseline Economies
Optimal w/ OPT DEF Optimal w/o OPT DEF Non-optimal w/o OPT DEF
Age [0.216, 10.24, 1] [0.055, 0.053, 0] [0.216, 10.24, 1]
23-34 -7.51 +0.94 +9.49
35-46 -19.62 -3.01 -3.43
47-55 -16.97 -5.04 -8.79
56-64 -10.38 -4.4 -6.14
65-76 -1.91 -0.3 +0.71
77-100 -0.6 +0.03 -8.06
‘Optimal w/ OPT DEF’ represents the results of the optimal health insurance policy in the economy
with the option to default. ‘Optimal w/o OPT DEF’ demonstrates the results of the optimal policy in
the economy without the option to default. ‘Non-optimal w/o OPT DEF’ displays the results for the
economy without the option to default while implementing the optimal health insurance policy for the
economy with the option to default.
The square brackets [] indicate the health insurance policy [M¯, ap, bp].
Unit = Percentage change from each of the baseline economies.
Table 20: Changes in the Average Consumption from Each of the Baseline Economies
Optimal w/ OPT DEF Optimal w/o OPT DEF Non-optimal w/o OPT DEF
Age [0.216, 10.24, 1] [0.055, 0.053, 0] [0.216, 10.24, 1]
23-34 +2.97 -1.13 -7.92
35-46 +2.51 +0.34 -19.34
47-55 +2.04 +1.31 -21.34
56-64 +1.57 +1.64 -22.83
65-76 -0.01 +0.75 -18.35
77-100 -1.24 -0.2 -12.19
‘Optimal w/ OPT DEF’ represents the results of the optimal health insurance policy in the economy
with the option to default. ‘Optimal w/o OPT DEF’ demonstrates the results of the optimal policy in
the economy without the option to default. ‘Non-optimal w/o OPT DEF’ displays the results for the
economy without the option to default while implementing the optimal health insurance policy for the
economy with the option to default.
The square brackets [] indicate the health insurance policy [M¯, ap, bp].
Unit = Percentage change from each of the baseline economies.
the threshold of income eligibility for Medicaid is much higher in the optimal policy with the op-
tion to default. With the option to default, the optimal policy expands Medicaid up to working-age
households whose income is 21.6 percent of the average income, but without the option to default,
the optimal policy reduces the thresholds to working-age households whose income is 5.3 percent
of the average income. The reduction in the threshold level increases consumption inequality be-
cause it reduces disposable income for low-income households. Inequality in consumption by the
elderly increases in both economies because all these old households have to pay more taxes. The
last column implies that its dispersion of consumption falls because of its more progressive income
tax.
Note that welfare related to changes in the distribution of consumption is affected not only by
54
Table 21: Changes in the STD of the Log of Consumption from Each of the Baseline Economies
Optimal w/ OPT DEF Optimal w/o OPT DEF Non-optimal w/o OPT DEF
Age [0.216, 10.24, 1] [0.055, 0.053, 0] [0.216, 10.24, 1]
23-34 -0.72 +0.24 -7.29
35-46 -5.44 +5.78 -14.45
47-55 -7.56 +5.17 -11.46
56-64 -8.54 -1.18 -2.28
65-76 -3.66 -0.97 -5.82
77-100 -1.68 -0.32 -7.5
‘Optimal w/ OPT DEF’ represents the results of the optimal health insurance policy in the economy
with the option to default. ‘Optimal w/o OPT DEF’ demonstrates the results of the optimal policy in
the economy without the option to default. ‘Non-optimal w/o OPT DEF’ displays the results for the
economy without the option to default while implementing the optimal health insurance policy for the
economy with the option to default.
The square brackets [] indicate the health insurance policy [M¯, ap, bp].
Unit = Percentage change from each of the baseline economies.
consumption inequality within cohorts but also by the curvature of the life-cycle profile of con-
sumption. If the average levels of consumption for young and old households increase, welfare
improves not only through changes in the level of consumption but also through those in the distri-
bution of consumption. This phenomenon occurs because these changes make the life-cycle profile
of consumption flatter. This mechanism helps to understand the relationship between changes in
consumption and welfare implications. In the economy with the option to default, although the
optimal policy reduces consumption inequality within all age groups, it decreases the average
consumption for old households, which makes the profile more curved. Hence, this policy im-
proves welfare due to the level of consumption but has a small welfare loss from the distribution of
consumption. In the case without the option to default, whereas the optimal policy increases con-
sumption inequality within working-age cohorts, this policy increases the average consumption for
households aged between 65 and 76, and the magnitude of the decrease in the consumption among
households aged between 77 and 100 is mild. This policy improves welfare from changes in the
distribution of consumption, which means that in this case, the effects of the changes in the life-
cycle profile of consumption dominate those of changes in the inequality of consumption within
cohorts in welfare changes.
5 Conclusion
This paper examines how defaults and bankruptcies affect optimal health insurance. I build a life-
cycle general equilibrium model in which agents have the option to default on their emergency
medical bills and financial debts. They decide to invest in health capital and occasionally face
emergency room events. Using micro and macro data, I calibrate the model based on the U.S.
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economy and use the model for the optimal health insurance policy. Then, I compare the optimal
health insurance policy with the option to default to the optimal policy without the option to default.
I find that the availability of the option to default makes substantial differences in the features
of the optimal health insurance. With no option to default, the optimal health insurance policy is
almost the same as the health insurance system in the baseline economy. When the option to default
is not available, households take care of their health more carefully through medical spending
because health risks would otherwise become huge financial burdens over the life-cycles. However,
when the option to default is available, the optimal health insurance is much more redistributive
than the health insurance system in the baseline economy, which means that households with
the option to default rely on defaults and bankruptcies as implicit health insurance. Therefore,
implementing more redistributive health insurance policies can improve welfare by reducing the
dependence on this implicit health insurance and changing households’ medical spending behavior
to be more preventative.
Regarding future research, it is important to understand the effects of other financial institu-
tional features on healthcare reforms. In particular, housing plays an important role in households’
borrowing and saving behavior. Examining how housing policies interact with optimal health in-
surance needs to be studied, given the importance of housing in households’ financial activities.
In addition, elaborating the insurance choice behavior of the elderly is essential. Here, health in-
surance policies are for working-age individuals, so those for the elderly are simplified. Given the
considerable effect of long-term care on aggregate savings, as shown in Kopecky and Koreshkova
(2014), studying how long-term care risks and health insurance interact with financial risks is a
meaningful task. Such analyses are deferred to future work.
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Appendix A Charges from ER Events across Income Levels
Table 22: Charges from ER Events by Income Groups
Income Average Charges of ER Events*
0-20 pct 2443.56
20-40 pct 2436.46
40-60 pct 2249.54
60-80 pct 2307.37
80-100 pct 2325.41
Source: author’s calculation based on the
MEPS 2000-2011
* Unit = U.S. Dollar in 2000
Table 23: Charges from ER Events by Age and Income Groups
Average Charges for ER Events*
Income Age 23 - 34 Age 35 - 46 Age 47 - 55 Age 56 -64 Age 65 - 76 Age 77 - 91
0-20 pct 1992.87 2222.93 2549.63 3025.09 2616.33 3154.18
20-40 pct 2094.95 2066.45 2752.9 2820.07 2902.95 2657.69
40-60 pct 2030.77 2129.41 2603.14 2625.31 2112.71 2197.29
60-80 pct 2023.42 2244.27 2394.9 2582.79 2348.57 2607.37
80-100 pct 2209.8 2051.07 2577.25 2464.83 2687.7 2284.63
Source: author’s calculation based on the MEPS
* Unit = U.S. Dollar in 2000
Table 24: Regression Result of the Log of ER Charges
Only Income Age and Income
log income 0.122 (0.144) 0.12(0.144)
age 0.005778 (0.004)
I run an OLS regression of the log of ER charges
on the log of income and age.
The parentheses indicate p-values.
1
Table 22 shows that differences in the average charges from ER events are small across income
levels. The maximum gap is smaller than 200 dollars. Table 23 also confirms that the result is still
robust after controlling age groups. There is no monotonic relationship between income and the
amount of charges for ER events across age groups. Lastly, Table 24 indicates that the correlation
between the log of charges for the ER and the log of income is not statistically significant at the 10
percent level.
2
Appendix B Findings on Emergency Room Visits, Medical
Conditions, and Bankruptcy
Table 25: Correlation Between Health Risks and Income
Moment Value
Corr b.w. Medical Conditions and Income −0.146∗
Corr b.w. Fraction of ER Visits and Income −0.078∗
[*]: statistically significant at the 5 level.
Table 25 shows that both medical conditions quantified by health shocks and the fraction of emer-
gency room visits are negatively correlated with income.23 The correlation between medical condi-
tions and income is -0.146, and the correlation of the fraction of emergency room visits and income
is -0.078. This indicates that the level of health risks differs across income levels. Low-income in-
dividuals are more exposed to health shocks than high-income individuals, and the poor are more
exposed to emergency medical events, which is an important channel for default on emergency
medical bills through the EMTALA.
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Figure 15: Age Profile of Medical Conditions
Figure 15 indicates the life cycle profile of medical conditions quantified by health shocks
between high-income individuals and low-income individuals. Differences in medical conditions
across income groups are shown over the whole phase of life-cycle. The gap in medical conditions
increases until age 55 and declines around retirement periods and the difference gets diminished
23Appendix F presents how medical conditions in the Medical Expenditure and Panel Survey (MEPS) are quantified
in details.
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and keeps declining until later life. The gap rapidly rises until age 55, and decreases around
retirement periods and getting smaller in later life. The gap is large when households within an age
group are revealed by more different healthcare circumstances. For example, old households have
small differences, as their healthcare circumstance might be more similar than young households
due to Medicare.
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Figure 16: Age Profile of the Fraction of Emergency Room Visits
Figure 16 shows that the fraction of visiting emergency rooms between the top 20 percent
income individuals and the bottom 20 percent income individuals over the life cycle. Differences in
emergency room visits across income groups appear over the whole phase of life-cycle. These gaps
become disproportionately larger during working-age periods. This implies that during working-
age periods, low-income individuals are more substantially exposed to emergency medical events,
which may lead low-income individuals medical defaults through the EMTALA. Given that old
households have more similar health-related circumstances due to Medicare, the gap is larger when
households within an age group have more differences in their health-related circumstances.
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Table 26: Average Health Status by Bankruptcy Filing
Health Status (PSID) Health Status (SCF)
23 ≤ Age ≤ 100 23 ≤ Age ≤ 64 23 ≤ Age ≤ 100 23 ≤ Age ≤ 64
B.K. in 2 yrs 2.62 2.6 2.27 2.26
None 2.32 2.2 1.96 2.05
In the PSID, Excellent=1, Very good=2, Good=3, Fair=4, Poor=5.
In the SCF, Excellent=1, Good=2, Fair=3, Poor=4.
Source: Author’s calculation based on the PSID in 1996 and the SCF in 2001.
Table 26 implies that those who have filed for bankruptcy in 2 years tend to have worse health
status than those who did not file for bankruptcy. This findings is confirmed in both the PSID and
the SCF.24 This difference is still robust in working-age samples.
Table 27: Average Earnings by Bankruptcy Filing
Earnings (PSID) Earnings (SCF)
B.K. in 2 yrs 23643.3 32073.1
None 35130.6 53861.9
All samples are aged between 23 and 64.
In the PSID, Unit is U.S. dollar in 1995.
In the SCF, Unit is U.S. dollar in 2000.
Source: Author’s calculation based on the PSID in
1996 and the SCF in 2001.
Table 27 shows that those who have filed for bankruptcy in 2 years have lower earnings than
those who have no record related to bankruptcy filings. This is consistent with previous findings in
the empirical literature. This results is observed in both the PSID and the SCF.
To sum up, first, the level of health risks vary across income groups. Low-income individuals
are more exposed to health risks. In particular, the poor visit emergency rooms more frequently,
which is an important trigger of default on emergency medical bills via the EMTALA. Second,
those who have a record of filing for bankruptcies tend to have worse health status and low earnings.
These findings imply interrelations among income, health risks and financial risks.
24A lower number means a better health status, although it is hard to interpreter the meaning of differences in
numbers, as these numbers just indicate the ordering of health statuses.
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Appendix C Household Dynamic Problems
The households’ optimal decision problems can be represented recursively. I begin with the prob-
lems of working-age households. They start working at the initial age J0 and continue working
until age Jr − 1. The state of working-age households is (a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, ζ, η, ω) and υ ∈ {G,B},
where a is their level of assets, i is health insurance, h is the stock of health capital, ǫe is emer-
gency health shock, ǫn is non-emergency health shock, ζ is non-medical expense shocks, η is
idiosyncratic shock on labor productivity and ω is the current offer status for employer-based
health insurance. υ is the current credit history, where G and B mean good and bad credit history,
respectively.
At the beginning of sub-period 1, emergency health shocks ǫe, non-emergency health shocks
ǫn, non-medical expense shocks ζ , idiosyncratic shocks on earnings η, and the employer-
based health insurance offer ω are realized. Next, individuals decide whether to default. Let
V Gj (a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, ζ, η, ω) (V
B
j (a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, ζ, η, ω)) denote the value function of age j < Jr agent
with a good (bad) credit history in sub-period 1. They solve
V Gj (a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, ζ, η, ω) = max {v
G,N
j (a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, ζ, η, ω), v
G,D
j (i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω)} (27)
V Bj (a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, ζ, η, ω) = max {v
B,N
j (a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, ζ, η, ω), v
B,D
j (i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω)} (28)
where vG,Nj (a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, ζ, η, ω) (v
B,N
j (a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, ζ, η, ω)) is the value of non-defaulting with
a good credit (bad credit) history and vG,Dj (i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω) (v
B,D
j (i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω)) is the value of
defaulting with a good credit (bad credit) history. The values of defaulting, vG,Dj (i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω)
and vB,Dj (i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω), do not depend on the current assets a, as all assets and debts are elimi-
nated with the default decision, a = 0.
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Non-defaulters with a good credit history at age j < Jr in age group jg solve
vG,Nj (a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ζ, ω) = max
{c, a
′
, i
′
, mn≥0}
[(
λuc
v−1
v + (1− λu)h
v−1
v
c
) v
v−1
]1−σ
1− σ
+ βπj+1|j(hc, jg) E
ǫ′e|h
′ ,ǫ′n|h
′
,η
′
|η,ω
′
|η
′
,ζ
′
[
V Gj+1(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
, ǫ
′
e, ǫ
′
n, η
′
, ζ
′
, ω
′
)
]
(29)
such that
c+ q(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
; j, η)a
′
+ pi′ (hc, jg)
≤ (1− τss − τmed)wω¯jh
φh
c η + a
− (1− qni )mn + (1− q
e
i )me(ǫe)− ζ − T (y) + κ
ζ ∼ U [0, ζ¯]
hc = (1− ǫn)(1− ǫe)h
h
′
= hc + ϕjgm
ψjg
n = (1− ǫn)(1− ǫe)h+ ϕjgm
ψjg
n
i ∈ {NHI,MCD, IHI,EHI}
i
′
∈


{NHI,MCD, IHI,EHI} if y ≤ y¯ & ω = 1
{NHI,MCD, IHI} if y ≤ y¯ & ω = 0
{NHI, IHI,EHI} if y > y¯ & ω = 1
{NHI, IHI} if y > y¯ & ω = 0.
y = wωjh
φh
c η + (
1
qrf
− 1)a · 1a>0
where c is consumption, a
′
is asset holdings in the next period, i
′
is the purchase of health insurance
for the next period, mn is non-emergency medical expenditure, hc is the current health status
and β is the discount rate. πj+1|j(hc, jg) is the rate of surviving up to age j + 1 condition on
surviving up to age j with the current status of health hc in age group jg. Eǫ′e|h′ ,ǫ′n|h′ ,η′ |η,ω′ |η′ ,ζ′ is
an expectation that is taken to non-medical expense shocks ζ
′
, (non-) emergency health shocks
(ǫ
′
n) ǫ
′
e, idiosyncratic shocks on labor productivity η
′
and the offer probability of employer-based
health insurance ω
′
, conditional on the current idiosyncratic labor productivity η and health capital
h
′
for the next period. q(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
; j, η) is the discount rate of loan for households with future
endogenous state, (a
′
, i
′
, h
′
), conditional on the current idiosyncratic labor productivity, η and
age j, and pi′ (hc, jg) is the premium of health insurance i
′
for the next period given the current
health status hc and age group jg. τss and τmed are payroll taxes for Social Security and Medicare,
7
respectively. w is the market equilibrium wage, ω¯j is age-deterministic labor productivity, φc is
the elasticity of earnings with respect to current health status hc, and η is idiosyncratic shock on
labor productivity. qni and q
e
i are the coverage rate of health insurance i for non-emergency and
emergency medical expense, respectively. me(ǫe) is emergency medical expense, T (·) is income
tax, y is total income, and κ is accidental bequest. NHI means no health insurance, MCD is
Medicaid, IHI is private individual health insurance, EHI is employer-based health insurance,
y¯ is the threshold for Medicaid eligibility, ω is the current offer status for employer-based health
insurance, qrf is the discount rate of the risk-free bond, and 1a>0 is the indicator function for
savings. Thus, ( 1
qrf
− 1)a means capital income.
Note that the expectation is taken to emergency and non-emergency health shocks conditional
on health capital h
′
for the next period, ǫ
′
e|h
′
and ǫ
′
n|h
′
, as the distributions of these health shocks
are determined by health capital h
′
. In addition, the probability of the offer for employer-based
health insurance is conditional on idiosyncratic shocks on earnings η
′
in the next period, as the
offer rate ω
′
increases with labor productivity level η
′
.
Non-defaulters with a good credit history have an endowment from their labor income
wω¯jh
φh
c η, their current assets a and accidental bequest κ. Then, these households access finan-
cial intermediary to either borrow (a
′
< 0) at prices that reflect their default risk or save (a
′
> 0)
at the risk-free interest rate. Afterward, they make decisions on consumption c, the purchase of
health insurance i
′
and non-emergency medical expenditures mn. In turn, non-defaulters with a
good credit history pay a health insurance premium pi′ (hc, jg), an out-of-pocket medical expendi-
tures (1− qi)(mn +me(ǫe)), payroll taxes for Social Security and Medicaid (τss + τmed)wω¯jh
φh
c η
and income tax T (y) for income y = wωjh
φh
c η + (
1
qrf
− 1)a · 1a>0. They preserve the good credit
history until the next period.
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Defaulting households with a good credit history at age j < Jr in age group jg solve
vG,Dj (i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω) = max
{c, i
′
, mn≥0}
[(
λuc
v−1
v + (1− λu)h
v−1
v
c
) v
v−1
]1−σ
1− σ
+ βπj+1|j(hc, jg) E
ǫ′e|h
′ ,ǫ′n|h
′
,η
′
|η,ω
′
|η
′
,ζ
′
[
V Bj+1(0, i
′
, h
′
, ǫ
′
e, ǫ
′
n, ζ
′
, η
′
, ω
′
)
]
(30)
such that
c+ pi′ (hc, jg) = (1− τss − τmed)wω¯jh
φh
c η − (1− q
n
i )mn − T (y) + κ
ζ ∼ U [0, ζ¯]
hc = (1− ǫn)(1− ǫe)h
h
′
= hc + ϕjgm
ψjg
n = (1− ǫn)(1− ǫe)h+ ϕjgm
ψjg
n
i ∈ {NHI,MCD, IHI,EHI}
i
′
∈


{NHI,MCD, IHI,EHI} if y ≤ y¯ & ω = 1
{NHI,MCD, IHI} if y ≤ y¯ & ω = 0
{NHI, IHI,EHI} if y > y¯ & ω = 1
{NHI, IHI} if y > y¯ & ω = 0.
y = wωjh
φh
c η + (
1
qrf
− 1)a · 1a>0.
On their budget constraint, debts from the financial intermediaries a, and emergency medical ex-
penditures me(ǫe) and non-medical expense shocks ζ do not appear, as these individuals default
on these two types of unsecured debts. Defaulters can determine the level of consumption c, the
purchase of health insurance for the next period i
′
, and non-emergency medical expenditure mn,
while they can neither save nor dissave in this period. In turn, they pay a health insurance premium
pi′ (hc, jg), an out-of-pocket medical expenditures (1−qi)mn, payroll taxes for Social Security and
Medicaid (τss + τmed)wω¯jh
φh
c η, and income tax T (y) for their labor income y = wωjh
φh
c η.
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Non-defaulters with a bad credit history at age j < Jr in age group jg solve
vB,Nj (a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ζ, ω) = max
{c, a
′
≥0, i
′
,mn≥0}
[(
λuc
v−1
v + (1− λu)h
v−1
v
c
) v
v−1
]1−σ
1− σ
(31)
+ βπj+1|j(hc, jg) E
ǫ′e|h
′ ,ǫ′n|h
′
,η
′
|η,ω
′
|η
′
,ζ
′
[
λV Gj+1(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
, ǫ
′
e, ǫ
′
n, ζ
′
, η
′
, ω
′
)
+ (1− λ)V Bj+1(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
, ǫ
′
e, ǫ
′
n, ζ
′
, η
′
, ω
′
)
]
such that
c+ qrfa
′
+ pi′ (hc, jg)
≤ (1− τss − τmed)(1− χ)wω¯jh
φh
c η + a+ κ
− (1− qni )mn + (1− q
e
i )me(ǫe)− ζ − T (y)
ζ ∼ U [0, ζ¯]
hc = (1− ǫn)(1− ǫe)h
h
′
= hc + ϕjgm
ψjg
n = (1− ǫn)(1− ǫe)h+ ϕjgm
ψjg
n
i ∈ {NHI,MCD, IHI,EHI}
i
′
∈


{NHI,MCD, IHI,EHI} if y ≤ y¯ & ω = 1
{NHI,MCD, IHI} if y ≤ y¯ & ω = 0
{NHI, IHI,EHI} if y > y¯ & ω = 1
{NHI, IHI} if y > y¯ & ω = 0.
y = wωjh
φh
c η + (
1
qrf
− 1)a · 1a>0
where λ is the probability of recovering their credit history to be good, and χ is a proportion
of earnings that is paid for the pecuniary cost of staying with a bad credit history. Although the
problem of non-defaulters with bad credit is similar to that of non-defaulters with good credit, there
are three differences between two problems. First, non-defaulters with bad credit are not allowed
to borrow but they can save, a
′
≥ 0. Second, they need to pay the pecuniary cost of having a bad
credit history as much as a fraction χ of earnings, χwω¯jh
φh
c η. Lastly, the status of its credit history
in the next period is not deterministic. With a probability of λ, the status of credit history for
non-defaulters with a bad credit history changes to be good, and they stay with a bad credit history
with a probability of 1− λ. This process reflects the exclusion penalty in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy of
10 years in the U.S.
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Defaulters with a bad credit history at age j < Jr in age group jg solve
vB,Dj (i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω) = max
{c, i
′
, mn≥0}
[(
λuc
v−1
v + (1− λu)h
v−1
v
c
) v
v−1
]1−σ
1− σ
+ βπj+1|j(hc, jg) E
ǫ′e|h
′ ,ǫ′n|h
′
,η
′
|η,ω
′
|η
′
,ζ
′
[
V Bj+1(0, i
′
, h
′
, ǫ
′
e, ǫ
′
n, η
′
, ω
′
)
]
(32)
such that
c+ pi′ (hc, jg) = (1− τss − τmed)(1− χ)wω¯jh
φh
c η − (1− qi)mn − T (y) + κ
ζ ∼ U [0, ζ¯]
hc = (1− ǫn)(1− ǫe)h
h
′
= hc + ϕjgm
ψjg
n = (1− ǫn)(1− ǫe)h+ ϕjgm
ψjg
n
i ∈ {NHI,MCD, IHI,EHI}
i
′
∈


{NHI,MCD, IHI,EHI} if y ≤ y¯ & ω = 1
{NHI,MCD, IHI} if y ≤ y¯ & ω = 0
{NHI, IHI,EHI} if y > y¯ & ω = 1
{NHI, IHI} if y > y¯ & ω = 0.
y = wωjh
φh
c η + (
1
qrf
− 1)a · 1a>0.
The problem of defaulters with a bad credit history has two differences compared to the case of
households with a good credit history. First, defaulters with a bad credit history have to pay the
pecuniary cost of staying bad credit as much as a fraction χ of their earnings, χwω¯jh
φh
c η. Second,
they default only on emergency medical expenses and non-medical expense shocks. For defaulters
with bad credit, their previous status is either non-defaulter with bad credit or defaulters with good
credit. In both statuses, individuals could not make any financial loan in the previous period.
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Retired households at age Jr ≤ j ≤ J¯ in age group jg solve
V rj (a, h, ǫe, ǫn, ζ) = max
{c, a′≥ 0, mn≥0}
[(
λuc
v−1
v + (1− λu)h
v−1
v
c
) v
v−1
]1−σ
1− σ
(33)
+ βπj+1|j(hc, jg) E
ǫ′e|h
′ ,ǫ′n|h
′
,ζ
′
[
V rj+1(a
′
, h
′
, ǫ
′
e, ǫ
′
n, ζ
′
)
]
such that
ζ ∼ U [0, ζ¯]
c+ qrfa
′
+ pmed ≤ ss+ a+ κ− (1− q
n
med)mn − (1− q
e
med)me(ǫe)− ζ − T (y)
hc = (1− ǫn)(1− ǫe)h
h
′
= hc + ϕjgm
ψjg
n = (1− ǫn)(1− ǫe)h+ ϕjgm
ψjg
n
y = ss+ (
1
qrf
− 1)a · 1a>0
where ss is Social Security benefit, pmed is the Medicare premium, and (q
e
med) q
n
med is the coverage
rate of Medicare for (non-) emergency medical expenses. For simplicity, retired households cannot
borrow, but they can save. I assume that retired households do not access private health insurance
markets. Retired households do not have labor income, but receive Social Security benefit, ss, in
each period. Thus, they pay income tax based on Social Security benefit ss and capital income
( 1
qrf
− 1)a · 1a>0. Retired households do not pay payroll taxes, as they do have labor income.
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Appendix D Proof of proposition 2.7.1
Clausen and Strub (2017) introduce an envelope theorem to prove that First Order Conditions are
necessary conditions for the global solution. They show that the envelop theorem is applicable to
default models where idiosyncratic shocks on earnings are iid. I extend their application to solve
this model, which has persistent idiosyncratic shocks on earnings. To use their envelope theorem,
it is necessary to introduce the following definition.
Definition D.0.1. I say that F : C → R is differentiably sandwiched between the lower and
upper support functions L,U : C → R at c¯ ∈ C if
1. L is a differentiable lower support function of F at c¯,i.e L is differentiable, L(c) ≤ F (c) for
all c ∈ C, and L(c¯) = F (c¯).
2. U is a differentiable upper support function of F at c¯,i.e U is differentiable, U(c) ≥ F (c) for
all c ∈ C, and U(c¯) = F (c¯).
Let us begin with the FOC (17): For any a
′
> arbl(¯i
′
, h¯
′
; j, η)
∂q(a
′
, i¯
′
, h¯
′
; j, η)a
′
∂a′
∂u(c, (1− ǫe)(1− ǫn)h¯)
∂c
=
∂WG(a
′
, i¯
′
, h¯
′
, η, j + 1)
∂a′
.
Lemma 2 (Maximum Lemma) and Lemma 3 (Reverse Calculus) in Clausen and Strub (2017) tell
me that if each constituent function (q, u,WG) of the FOC (17) has a differential lower support
function at a point a
′
, q × u and WG are differentiable at a
′
and the FOC (17) is a necessary
condition for the global solution.
Formally, the proof of proposition 2.7.1 is as follows:
Proof. u(·, (1−ǫe)(1−ǫn)h¯) has trivially a differentiable lower support function, as itself is differ-
entiable by the assumption. By lemma D.1 and lemma D.2, the discount rate of loan q(·, i¯
′
, h¯
′
; j, η)
and the expected value functionWG(·, i¯
′
, h¯
′
, η, j+1) have a differentiable lower support function,
respectively. That implies that each u(·, (1−ǫe)(1−ǫn)h¯), q(·, i¯
′
, h¯
′
; j, η) andWG(·, i¯
′
, h¯
′
, η, j+1)
has a differentiable lower support function. Lemma 3 (Reverse Calculus) in Clausen and Strub
(2017) implies that the FOC (17) exists and holds.
LemmaD.1. Let a state (¯i
′
, h¯
′
; j, η) be given. Let arbl(¯i
′
, h¯
′
; j, η) be the risk borrowing limit (credit
limit) of q(·, i¯
′
, h¯
′
; j, η). For all a
′
> arbl(¯i
′
, h¯
′
; j, η), the discount rate of loan q(·, i¯
′
, h¯
′
; j, η) has a
differentiable lower support function.
Proof. Case1: For any a ≥ 0, q(a
′
, i¯
′
, h¯
′
; j, η) = 1
1+rrf
, and there by
∂q(a
′
,¯i
′
,h¯
′
;j,η)a
′
∂a
′ = 0. Thus,
q(a
′
, i¯
′
, h¯
′
; j, η) itself is a differentiable lower support function.
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Case2: For any arbl(¯i
′
, h¯
′
; j, η) < a
′
< 0, q(a
′
, i¯
′
, h¯
′
; j, η) = 1−d(a
′
,¯i
′
,h¯
′
;j,η)
1+rrf
. It implies that
finding a lower differentiable support function of q(a
′
, i¯
′
, h¯
′
; j, η) is equivalent to doing a upper
differentiable support function of
d(a
′
, i¯
′
, h¯
′
; j, η) =
∑
ǫ
′
n,ǫ
′
e,η
′ ,ω′ πǫ′e|h
′πǫ′n|h
′πη′ |ηπω′ |η′1{vG,N (a′ ,s′
1
,η
′
,j+1) ≤ vG,D(s
′
1
,η
′
,j+1)}
, where s
′
1 = (¯i
′
, h¯
′
, ǫ
′
e, ǫ
′
n, ω
′
). Let us transform πη′ |η to a continuous PDF f(η
′
|η). Given state
s
′
1, let us denote δ(a
′
, η; s
′
1) = πǫ′e|h′πǫ′n|h′
∫
1{vG,N(a′ ,s
′
1
,η′ ,j+1) ≤ vG,D(s
′
1
,η′ ,j+1)}πω′ |η′ f(η
′
|η)dη
′
.
Since a
′
> arbl(¯i
′
, h¯
′
; j, η), {η
′
: vG,N(a
′
, s
′
1, η
′
, j + 1) ≤ vG,D(s
′
1, η
′
, j + 1)} is non-empty.
Theorem 3 (The Maximal Default Set Is a Closed Interval) and Theorem 4 (Maximal Default Set
Expands with Indebtedness) in Chatterjee et al. (2007) imply that for any a
′
> arbl(¯i
′
, h¯
′
; j, η) and
for each state (s
′
1, η
′
, j + 1) , there are two points η
′
1(a
′
; s
′
1, j + 1) and η
′
2(a
′
; s
′
1, j + 1) such that (i)
{η
′
: vG,N(a
′
, s
′
1, η
′
, j + 1) ≤ vG,D(s
′
1, η
′
, j + 1)} = [η
′
1(a
′
; s
′
1, j + 1), η
′
2(a
′
; s
′
1, j + 1)] and (ii)
for any a
′
< a
′′
, [η
′
1(a
′
; s
′
1, j + 1), η
′
2(a
′
; s
′
1, j + 1)] ⊂ [η
′
1(a
′′
; s
′
1, j + 1), η
′
2(a
′′
; s
′
1, j + 1)]. The first
property means∫
{η
′
:vG,N (a
′
,s
′
1
,η
′
,j+1) ≤ vG,D(s
′
1
,η
′
,j+1)}
πω′ |η′f(η
′
|η)dη
′
=
∫
η
′
∈[η
′
1
(a
′
;s
′
1
,j+1),η
′
2
(a
′
;s
′
1
,j+1)]
πω′ |η′f(η
′
|η)dη
′
, and the second property implies that η
′
1(a
′
; s
′
1, j + 1) increases with a
′
and η
′
2(a
′
; s
′
1, j + 1)
decreases with a
′
.
Since
∫
η
′
∈[η
′
1
(a
′
;s
′
1
,j+1),η
′
2
(a′ ;s
′
1
,j+1)]
πω′ |η′f(η
′
|η)dη
′
=
∫ η′
2
(a
′
;s
′
1
,j+1)
−∞
πω′ |η′f(η
′
|η)dη
′
−
∫ η′
1
(a
′
;s
′
1
,j+1)
−∞
πω′ |η′f(η
′
|η)dη
′
, if there is an upper differentiable
support of
∫ η′
2
(a
′
;s
′
1
,j+1)
−∞
πω′ |η′f(η
′
|η)dη
′
and an lower differentiable support of∫ η′
1
(a
′
;s
′
1
,j+1)
−∞
πω′ |η′f(η
′
|η)dη
′
, δ(a
′
, η; s
′
1) =
∫
η
′
∈[η
′
1
(a
′
;s
′
1
,j+1),η
′
2
(a
′
;s
′
1
,j+1)]
πω′ |η′ f(η
′
|η)dη
′
has a dif-
ferentiable lower support. Without loss of generality, I will prove the existence of a differentiable
upper support of∫ η′
2
(a
′
;s
′
1
,j+1)
−∞
πω′ |η′f(η
′
|η)dη
′
.
Claim:
∫ η′
2
(a
′
;s
′
1
,j+1)
−∞
πω′ |η′f(η
′
|η)dη
′
has an upper differentiable support.
Proof of the claim: Finding an upper support function of
∫ η′
2
(a
′
;s
′
1
,j+1)
−∞
πω′ |η′f(η
′
|η)dη
′
is
equivalent to searching for an upper support function of η
′
2(a
′
; s
′
1, j + 1). I am going to use the
implicit function theorem to find an upper differentiable support. Take any aˆ
′
> arbl(¯i
′
, h¯
′
; j, η)
and η
′
∈ (η
′
1(aˆ
′
; s
′
1, j+1), η
′
2(aˆ
′
; s
′
1, j+1)). Pick any ǫ1 < η
′
2(aˆ
′
; s
′
1, j+1)−η
′
1(aˆ
′
; s
′
1, j+1). Con-
sider a case that for a realized value (a
′
, η
′
) ∈ B((aˆ
′
, η
′
2(a
′
; s
′
1, j + 1)), ǫ), a household anticipates
state (a
′
, η
′
) = (a
′
, η
′
2(a
′
; s
′
1, j + 1)). In other words, the household correctly recognizes a
′
but
incorrectly acknowledges η
′
. Then, in the period after the next period, the decision rule for asset
holdings is a
′′
= ga(a
′
, η
′
2(a
′
; s
′
1, j + 1). Define this borrower’s net value function L(a
′
, η
′
; aˆ
′
) on
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B((a
′
, η
′
2(a
′
; s
′
1, j + 1)), ǫ) in the following way:
L(a
′
, η
′
; aˆ
′
) = u
(
wω¯jhcη
′
+ a
′
− (1− qi)(m
′
n +me(ǫ
′
e)) (34)
−T (y
′
) + κ
′
− q(ga(a
′
, η
′
2(a
′
i
′′
, h
′′
; η
′
2(a
′
; s
′
1, j + 1), j + 1)ga(a
′
i
′′
, h
′′
, η
′
2(a
′
; s
′
1, j + 1), j + 1)− pi′′ , h
′
c
)
−u
(
wω¯jhcη
′
− (1− qi)m
′
n − T (y
′
) + κ
′
− pi′′ , h
′
c
)
+βπj+2|j+1(h
′
c, jg) E
ǫ
′′
e
|h′′ ,ǫ′′
n
|h′′ ,η′′ |η
′
2
(a′ i′′ ,h′′ ),ω′′ |η′′
[ [
V G(ga(a
′
, η
′
2(a
′
i
′′
, h
′′
), η
′
2(a
′
; s
′
1, j + 1)), i
′′
, h
′′
, ǫ
′′
e , ǫ
′′
n, η
′′
, ω
′′
, j + 2)
]
−
[
V B(0, η
′
2(a
′
; s
′
1, j + 1)), i
′′
, h
′′
, ǫ
′′
e , ǫ
′′
n, η
′′
, ω
′′
, j + 2)
] ]
Note that the value function is continuous and differentiable on B
(
(aˆ
′
, η
′
2(aˆ
′
; s
′
1, j + 1)), ǫ
)
, as
the utility function u is differentiable. Also, this value function is an implicit function for a
′
and
η
′
, and L(aˆ
′
, η
′
2(aˆ
′
; s
′
1, j + 1)); aˆ
′
) = 0. The value function is differentiable with respect to η
′
and
its value is non-zero (positive). Thus, the implicit function theorem implies that there is an open
neighborhood U of aˆ
′
and an open neighborhood V of η
′
2(aˆ
′
; s
′
1, j + 1)) such that η¯
′
= η¯
′
(a
′
, aˆ
′
)
satisfies
L(a
′
, η¯
′
(a
′
, aˆ
′
); aˆ
′
) = 0
, where η¯
′
∈ V and a
′
∈ U . Since this household overvalues repaying debt, η¯
′
(·, aˆ
′
) is an upper
support of η
′
2(·; s
′
1, j + 1) at aˆ
′
. Furthermore, the implicit function theorem implies that η¯
′
(·, aˆ
′
) is
differentiable on U . Thus, η¯
′
(·, aˆ
′
) is an upper differentiable support function of η
′
2(·; s
′
1, j + 1)
at aˆ
′
. Since the statement holds for all a
′
> arbl(¯i
′
, h¯
′
; j, η), η
′
2(a
′
; s
′
1, j + 1) has an upper
differentiable upper support for all a
′
> arbl(¯i
′
, h¯
′
; j, η). Therefore, the claim is proven. Q.E.D.
Since
∫ η′
2
(a
′
;s
′
1
,j+1)
−∞
πω′ |η′f(η
′
|η)dη
′
has an upper differentiable support function,
d(a
′
, i¯
′
, h¯
′
; j, η) =
∑
ǫ
′
n,ǫ
′
e,η
′
,ω
′ πǫ′e|h′πǫ′n|h′
∫ η′
2
(a
′
;s
′
1
,j+1)
−∞
πω′ |η′f(η
′
|η)dη
′
has an upper differentiable
support function.
LemmaD.2. Let a state (¯i
′
, h¯
′
; j, η) be given. Let arbl(¯i
′
, h¯
′
; j, η) be the risk borrowing limit (credit
limit) of q(·, i¯
′
, h¯
′
; j, η). For all a
′
> arbl(¯i
′
, h¯
′
; j, η), the expected value functionWG(·, i¯
′
, h¯
′
; η, j+
1) has a differentiable lower support function.
Proof. To ease notation, let us denote s
′
1 = (¯i
′
, h¯
′
, ǫe, ǫn, η
′
, ω
′
)
(i) Case 1: a¯
′
> 0.
In this case, the discount rate of loan becomes qrf . I can use the standard technique of Benveniste
and Scheinkman’s theorem. Consider a case that for a realized value (a
′
, η
′
), a household takes
a
′′
= ga(a¯
′
, s
′
1, j + 1) for all a
′
and η
′
. Let us define this agent’s net value function L(a
′
, η
′
; a¯
′
) in
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the following way:
L0(a
′
, η
′
; a¯
′
, s
′
1) = u
(
wω¯jhcη
′
+ a
′
− (1− qi)(m
′
n +me(ǫ
′
e))− T (y
′
) + κ
′
− qrfga(a¯
′
, s
′
1, j + 1)− pi′′ , h
′
c
)
(35)
+βπj+2|j+1(h
′
c, jg) E
ǫ
′′
e
|h′′ ,ǫ′′
n
|h′′ ,η′′ |η′ ,ω′′ |η′′
[
V G(ga(a¯
′
, s
′
1, j + 1), i
′′
, h
′′
, ǫ
′′
e , ǫ
′′
n, η
′′
, ω
′′
, j + 2)
]
Since there is no debt, the agent does not default. Thus, L0(a¯
′
, η
′
; a¯
′
) = V G(a¯
′
, s
′
1) = v
G,N(a¯
′
, s
′
1)
and L(a
′
, η
′
; a¯
′
) ≤ V G(a
′
, s
′
1) for all a
′
≥ 0. Moreover, L(a
′
, η
′
; a¯
′
) is differentiable at a¯′ . There-
fore, L(·, η
′
; a¯
′
) is a lower differentiable support function of V G(a¯
′
, s
′
1).
(ii) Case2: arbl(¯i
′
, h¯
′
; j, η) < a¯
′
< 0.
Let us consider a case for realized value (a
′
, η
′
), a household takes a
′′
= ga(a¯
′
, s
′
1, j + 1) for all a
′
and η
′
. Let us define this agent’s net value function L1(a
′
, η
′
; a¯
′
) in the following way:
L1(a
′
, η
′
; a¯
′
, s
′
1) = max
{
u
(
wω¯jhcη
′
+ a
′
− (1− qi)(m
′
n +me(ǫ
′
e)) (36)
−T (y
′
) + κ
′
− q − q(ga(a
′
, s
′
1, j + 1), i
′′
, h
′′
; η
′
, j + 1)ga(a
′
, s
′
1, j + 1)− pi′′ , h
′
c
)
+βπj+2|j+1(h
′
c, jg) E
ǫ
′′
e
|h′′ ,ǫ′′
n
|h′′ ,η′′ |η′ ,ω′′ |η′′
[
V G(ga(a¯
′
, s
′
1, j + 1), i
′′
, h
′′
, ǫ
′′
e , ǫ
′′
n, η
′′
, ω
′′
, j + 2)
]
,
u
(
wω¯jhcη
′
− (1− qi)m
′
n − T (y
′
) + κ
′
− pi′′ , h
′
c
)
+βπj+2|j+1(h
′
c, jg) E
ǫ
′′
e
|h′′ ,ǫ′′
n
|h′′ ,η′′ |η′ ,ω′′ |η′′
[
V B(0, i
′′
, h
′′
, ǫ
′′
e , ǫ
′′
n, η
′′
, ω
′′
, j + 2)
]}
L1(a¯
′
, η
′
; a¯
′
) = V G(a¯
′
, s
′
1) and L
1(a
′
, η
′
; a¯
′
) ≤ V G(a
′
, s
′
1) for all a
′
≥ 0. Moreover, L(a
′
, η
′
; a¯
′
) is
differentiable with respect to a
′
. Therefore, L1(·, η
′
; a¯
′
) is a lower differentiable support function
of V G(a¯
′
, s
′
1).
Appendix E Recursive Equilibrium
I define a measure space to describe equilibrium. To ease notation, I denote S = A× I×H×ER×
NER × E × O × Υ as the state space of households, where A is the space of households’ assets
a, I is the space of households’ health insurance i, H is the space of households’ health capital h,
ER is the space of emergency health shocks ǫe, NER is the space of non-emergency health shocks
ǫn, O is the space of the offer of employer-based health insurance ω and Υ is the space of credit
history υ ∈ {G,B}. In addition, let B(S) denote the Borel σ-algebra on S. In addition, I denote
J = {J0, · · · , Jr, · · · , J¯} as the space of households’ age. Then, for each age j, a probability
measure µ(·, j) is defined on the Borel σ-algebra B(S) such that µ(·, j) : B(S) −→ [0, 1]. µ(B, j)
represents the measure of age j households whose state lies in B ∈ B(S) as a proportion of all age
j. The households’ distribution at age j in age group jg evolves as follows: For all B ∈ B(S),
µ(B, j + 1) =
∫
{s|(ga(s,j),gi(s,j),gh(s,j),ǫ′e,ǫ′n,η′ ,ω′ ,υ′)∈B}
[
Γυ
′
υ πj+1|j(hc, jg) πǫ′e|gh(s,j) πǫ′n|gh(s,j) πη′ |η πω′ |η′
]
µ(ds, j) (37)
where s = (a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω, υ) ∈ S is the individual state. ga(·, j) is the policy function for
assets at age j, gi(·, j) is the policy function for health insurance at age j, and gh(·, j) is the policy
function for health investment at age j. In addition, Γυ
′
υ is the transitional probability of credit
history υ
′
in the next period conditional on the current status of credit history υ, πj+1|j(hc, jg)
is the rate of surviving up to age j + 1 conditional on surviving up to age j with the current
health status hc in age group jg and πǫ′e|gh(s,j) (πǫ
′
n|gh(s,j)
) is the transition probability for ǫ
′
e (ǫ
′
n)
conditional on gh(s, j). πη′ |η is the transitional probability of idiosyncratic labor productivity for
the next period η
′
conditional on η and πω′ |η′ is the probability of receiving an employer-based
health insurance offer ω
′
for the next period conditional on η
′
.
Definition E.0.1 (Recursive Competitive Equilibrium). Given an distribution of newborn agents
B0 ∈ S, a social Security benefit ss, a Medicare coverage rate qmed, a Medicare premium pmed,
a subsidy rule for employer-based health insurance ψEHI , mark-ups of health private insurances
νIHI and νEHI , an income threshold for Medicaid eligibility y¯, health insurance coverage rates
{qMDC , qIHI , qEHI}, private individual health insurance pricing rules {pIHI(·, jg)}
4
jg=1, subsidies
for private individual health insurances ψEHI(·, ·), a tax policy, {T (·), τss, τmed},
a recursive competitive equilibrium is
a set of prices
{
w, rrf , r, qrf , {q(·, ·, ·, j, ·)}Jr−1j=J0 , {p(·, jg)}
4
jg=1, pmed
}
, a set of the mark-up of hospital {ζ}
, a set of decision rules for households
{
{gd(·, j), ga(·, j), gi(·, j), gh(·, j)}
J¯
j=J0
}
, a set of default probability function
{
d(·, ·, ·; j, ·)}J¯j=J0
}
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, a set of values
{{
V G(·, j), vG,N(·, j), vG,D(·, j), V B(·, j), vB,N(·, j), vB,D(·, j)
}Jr−1
j=J0
,
{
vG,r(·, j), vB,r(·, j)
}J¯
j=Jr
}
and distributions of households {µ(·, j)}J¯j=J0 such that
(i) Given prices, the policies above, the decision rules gd(s, j), ga(s, j), gi(s, j) and gh(s, j)
solve the household problems in Appendix C and V G(·, j), vG,N(·, j), vG,D(·, j), V B(·, j)
, vB,N(·, j), vB,D(·, j), vG,r(·, j) and vB,r(·, j) are the associated value functions.
(ii) Firm is competitive pricing:
w =
∂zF (K,N)
∂N
, r =
∂zF (K,N)
∂K
, where K is the quantity of aggregate capital, and N is the quantity of aggregate labor.
(iii) Loan prices and default probabilities are consistent, whereby lenders earn zero expected
profits on each loan of size a
′
for households with age j that have health insurance i
′
for
the next period, health capital h
′
for the next period and the current idiosyncratic shock on
earnings η:
q(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
; j, η) =
(1− d(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
; j, η))
1 + rrf
d(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
; j, η) =
∑
ǫ′n,ǫ
′
e,η
′ ,ω′
πǫ′e|h
′πǫ′n|h
′πη′ |ηπω′ |η′1{vG,N (s′n,j+1) ≤ vG,D(s
′
d
,j+1)}
, where s
′
n = (a
′
, i
′
, h
′
, ǫ
′
e, ǫ
′
n, η
′
, ω
′
, j + 1) and s
′
d = (i
′
, h
′
, ǫ
′
e, ǫ
′
n, η
′
, ω
′
, j + 1).
(iv) The hospital has zero profit:
J¯∑
j=J0
∫ {
[mn(s, j) + (1− gd(s, j))me(ǫe) + gd(s, j)max (a, 0)]
−
(mn(s, j) +me(ǫe))
ζ
}
µ(ds, j) = 0.
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(v) The bond market and the capital market are clear:
rrf = r − δ
qrf =
1
1 + rrf
K =
J¯∑
j=J0
[ ∫ (
q(ga(s, j), gi(s, j), gh(s, j); j, η)ga(s, j)
+ (p(gi, hc, jg) · 1{gi(s,j)∈{IHI,EHI}
)
µ(ds, j)
]
.
(vi) The labor market is clear:
N =
Jr−1∑
j=J0
[
ω¯j
∫
((1− ǫe)(1− ǫn)hη)µ(ds, j)
]
.
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(vii) The goods market is clear:
J¯∑
j=J0
[∫ (
c(s, j) +
mn(s, j) +me(ǫe)
ζ
)
µ(ds, j)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Aggregate Non-medical Consumption + Aggregate Medical Expenditures
+K − (1− δ)K︸ ︷︷ ︸
Aggregate Investment
+ G︸︷︷︸
Government Spending Irrelevant to Health Insurance
+
Jr−1∑
j=J0
[ ∫ { (
ψIHI(pIHI(hc, jg), y(s, j)) · 1{gi(s,j)=IHI}
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Government Subsidy for Private Individual Health Insurance IHI
+
(
ψEHI · pEHI · 1{gi(s,j)=EHI}
)}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Government Subsidy for Employer-Based Health Insurance EHI
µ(ds, j)
]
= zF (K,N)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total Output
−χw
Jr−1∑
j=J0
[
ω¯j
∫
((1− ǫe)(1− ǫn)hcgd(s, j))µ(ds, j)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Deadweight Loss from Default
−
Jr−1∑
j=J0
[∫ (
νgipgi(hc, jg)1{gi(s,j)∈{IHI,EHI}
)
µ(ds, j)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Deadweight Loss due to the Mark-up of Private Health Insurance Markets
.
(viii) The insurance markets are clear:
For each age group jg and each health group hg, the premium of the private individual health
insurance pIHI(hg, jg) satisfies
(1 + νIHI)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mark-up of IHI
∑
j∈Jg
∫
qIHI · 1{{i=IHI}∩{h∈hg}} · (mn(s, j) +me(ǫe,t))µ(ds, j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total Medical Expenditure Covered by IHI
= (1 + rrf ) pIHI(hg, jg)
∑
j∈Jg
∫
1{{gi(s,j)=IHI}∩{h∈hg}}µ(ds, j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total Demand for IHI
.
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The premium of the employer-based health Insurance pEHI satisfies
(1 + νEHI)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mark-up of EHI
Jr−1∑
j=J0
∫
qEHI · 1{i=EHI}(mn(s, j) +me(ǫe))µ(ds, j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total Medical Expenditure Covered by EHI
= (1 + rrf ) · pEHI ·
Jr−1∑
j=J0
∫
1{gi(s,j)=EHI}µ(ds, j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total Demand for EHI
.
(ix) Social Security (ss) and Medicare are financed by their own objective payroll taxes τss and
τmed. The government budget constraint is balanced:
J¯∑
j=Jr
∫
(ss)µ(ds, j)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total Social Security Benefit
=
Jr−1∑
j=J0
∫
τsswω¯jhcηµ(ds, j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Revenue from Social Security Tax
J¯∑
j=Jr
∫  qmed(mn(s, j) +me(ǫe,t))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Medical Expenses Covered by Medicare
− pmed︸︷︷︸
Medicare Premium

µ(ds, j) = Jr−1∑
j=J0
∫
τmedwω¯jhcηµ(ds, j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Revenue from Medicare Tax
G︸︷︷︸
Government Spending
+
Jr−1∑
j=J0
[ ∫ { (
ψIHI(pIHI(hc, jg), y(s, j)) · 1{gi(s,j)=IHI}
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Subsidy for IHI
+
(
ψEHI · pEHI · 1{gi(s,j)=EHI}
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Subsidy for EHI
}
µ(ds, j)
]
=
J∑
j=0
∫
T (y)µ(ds, j)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Revenue from Income Tax
.
(x) Distributions are consistent with individual behavior.
For all j ≤ J¯ − 1 and for all B ∈ B(S),
µ(B, j + 1) =
∫
{s|(ga(s,j),gi(s,j),gh(s,j),ǫ′e,ǫ′n,η′ ,ω′ ,υ′)∈B}
[
Γυ
′
υ πj+1|j(hc, jg) πǫ′e|gh(s,j) πǫ′n|gh(s,j) πη′ |η πω′ |η′
]
µ(ds, j)
, where s = (a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω, υ) ∈ S is the individual state.
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(xi) Accidental bequests κ are evenly distributed to all of the households:
κ =
J¯−1∑
j=J0
(∫
[(1− πj+1|j(hc, jg))(a(1 + r
rf )) · 1{a>0}]µ(ds, j)
)
.
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Appendix F Data Details
F.1 Data Cleansing
I choose the MEPS waves from 2000 to 2011. Among various data files in MEPS, by using indi-
vidual id (DUPERSID), I merger three types of data files: MEPS Panel Longitudinal files, Medical
Condition files, and Emergency Room visits files. To clean this data set, I take the following steps.
First, I identify household units with the Health Insurance Eligibility Unit (HIEU). Second, I de-
fine household heads who have the highest labor income within a HIEU. I eliminate households
in which the heads are non-respondents for key variables such as demographic features, educa-
tional information, medical expenditures, health insurance, health status, and medical conditions.
Second, among working age (23-64) head households, I drop families that have no labor income.
Third, I use the MEPS longitudinal weight in MEPS Panel Longitudinal file for each individual.
Since each survey of MEPS Panel Longitudinal files covers 2 consequent years, I stack individuals
in the 10 different panels into one data set. To use the longitudinal weight with my stacked data
set, I follow the way in Jeske and Kitao (2009). As they did, I rescale the longitudinal weight in
each survey to make the sum of the weight equal to the number of HIEUs. In this way, I address
the issues of different size of samples across surveys and reflect the longitudinal weight in each
survey. Lastly, I convert all nominal values into the value of U.S. dollar in 2000 with the CPI. The
number of observations in each panel is as follows.
Year 2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006
Numbers 5218 10187 7484 7577 7548 7294
Year 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011
Numbers 7721 5835 8611 7988 7020
Table 28: MEPS Panel Sample Size
F.2 Variable Definitions
Household Unit(MEPS Panel Longitudinal files, Medical Condition files, and Emergency
Room visits files): To define households, I use the Health Insurance Eligibility Units (HIEU) in
the MEPS. To capture behaviors related to health insurance, the HIEU is a more proper id than
dwelling unit. Since the HIEU is different from dwelling unit, even within a dwelling unit, multi-
ple HIEUs can exist. A HIEU includes spouses, unmarried natural or adoptive children of age 18
or under and children under 24 who are full-time students.
Head(MEPS Panel Longitudinal files): The MEPS does not formally define heads in households.
I define head by choosing the highest earner within a HIEU.
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Household Income (MEPS Panel Longitudinal files): The MEPS records individual total in-
come (TTLPY1X and TTPLY2X). Household income is the summation of all house members’
total income.
Medical Expenditures (MEPS Panel Longitudinal files): The MEPS provides information on
individual total medical expenditures (TOTEXPY1 and TOTEXPY2). However, this variable in-
cludes medical expenditures paid for by Veteran’s Affairs (TOTVAY1 and TOTVAY2), Workman’s
Compensation (TOTWCPY1 and TOTWCPY2) and other sources (TOTOSRY1 and TOTOSRY2)
that are not covered in this study, I redefine the total medical expenditure variable by subtracting
these three variables from the original total medical expenditure variable.
Insurance Status(MEPS Panel Longitudinal files): For working age head households, I catego-
rize four type of health insurance status: uninsured, Medicaid, individual health insurance, and
employer-based health insurance. The MEPS records whether each respondent has a health in-
surance, whether the insurance is provided by the government or private sectors (INSCOVY1 and
ISCOVY2), and whether to use Medicaid (MCDEVY1 and MCDEVY2). Using this variable, I de-
fine the uninsured and Medicaid users. The MEPS also records employer-based health insurance
holders (HELD1X, HELD2X, HELD3X, HELD4X, HELD5X) for five subsequent survey periods.
I define employer-based health insurance holders who have experience in holding employer-based
health insurance within a year. I define individual health insurance holders as those who do not
have employer-based health insurance (HELD1X, HELD2X, HELD3X, HELD4X, HELD5X) but
have a private health insurance (INSCOVY1 and INSCOVY2).
Employer-Based Health Insurance Offer rate (MEPS Panel Longitudinal files): The MEPS
provides information as to whether respondents’ employer offers health insurance (OFFER1X,
OFFER2X, OFFER3X, OFFER4X, OFFER5X).
Medical Conditions (Medical Condition files): The Medical Condition Files in the MEPS keep
track of individual medical condition records with various measures. I choose Clinical Classifica-
tion Code for identifying individual medical conditions (CCCODEX).
Health Shocks (Medical Condition files and morbidity measures from the WHO): In order to
quantify these individual medical conditions, I use a measure from the World Health Organization
(WHO). The WHO provides two types of measures to quantify the burden of diseases: mortality
measures (years of life lost to illness (YLL) and morbidity measures (years lived with disabil-
ity (YLD)). I use the adjusted morbidity measure in the study of Prados (2017). Table 29 is the
morbidity measures in Prados (2017).
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Table 29: Disability Weights (Source:Prados (2017))
For calculating health shocks from medical conditions, I follow the method in Prados (2017).
Let’s assume that a household hasD kinds of medical conditions. Denote di as the WHO index for
25
medical condition i, where i = 1, . . . , D. For this household, its health shock ǫh is represented by
(1− ǫh) =
D∏
i=1
(1− di). (38)
This measure well represents the features of medical condition in the sense that it reflects not only
multiple medical conditions but also differences in their severity.
Emergency Room Usages and Charges (Emergency Room Visits files): Emergency Room Vis-
its files in the MEPS record respondents who visit emergency rooms. These files records the Clin-
ical Classification Code as to why respondents visit emergency rooms (ERCCC1X, ERCCC2X,
ERCCC3x) and as to how much hospitals charge from emergency medical events to patients
(ERTC00X).
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Appendix G Computation Details
There are computational burdens in this problem, because not only the dimension of individual
state is large, but also the value functions of the model are involved with many non-concave and
non-smooth factors: the choice of default, health insurance, medical cost, progressive subsidy and
tax policies.
To solve the model with these complexities, I extend the endogenous grid method of Fella
(2014). He provides an algorithm to handle non-concavities on the value functions with an ex-
ogenous borrowing constraint. I generalize the method for default problems in which borrowing
constraints differ across individuals.
Whereas there are several types of value functions in the model, the computational issues are
mainly related to four types of value functions: the value function of non-defaulting households
with a good (bad) credit history vG,N (vB,N), the value function of retired households with a good
(bad) credit history vG,r (vB,r). 25 The value function with a bad credit history and two retired
households’ value functions are solved with the algorithm of Fella (2014), because these problems
have an exogenous borrowing constrain with discrete choice, which is consistent with the setting
of Fella (2014). My endogenous grid method is for solving the value function of non-defaulting
with a good credit history vG,N in which loan prices differ across individuals states.26
In the following subsections, first, I demonstrate how to solve the value of non-defaulting
households with a good credit history vG,N with my endogenous grid method.27 Then, I show how
to solve the other value functions with the endogenous grid method of Fella (2014).
G.1 Notation and Discretization of States
Before getting into details, let us begin with notations to explain the algorithm. To ease
notation, I denote s−a = (i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω, j) and s
′
p = (i
′
, h
′
, η, j). Then, V G(a, s−a) =
V G(a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω, j) and q(a
′
, s
′
p) = q(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
; j, η). I also denote WG(a
′
, s
′
p, hc) =
WG(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
, η, j, hc) as the expected value function of working households with good credit
conditional on η, hc, age j and age group jg, πj+1|j(hc, jg)Eǫ′e|h′ ,ǫ′n|h′ ,η′ |η,ω′ |η′
[
V G(a
′
, s
′
−a)
]
.
Ga′ = {a
′
1, · · · , a
′
N
a
′
} and GO = {O1, · · · , ONO} are the grid of asset holdings a
′
and cash on
hand O, respectively.
In the model, households need to make choices on three individual state variables: assets a,
health insurance i, and health capital h. I discretize two endogenous states: health insurance i and
25The value function of filing for default is not involved with any continuous choice variable.
26Jang and Lee (2018) extend this endogenous grid method to solve infinite horizon models with default risk and
aggregate uncertainty
27The steps I use here are also described in Jang and Lee (2018). They extend this endogenous grid method to solve
an infinite horizon model with default risk and aggregate uncertainty.
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health capital h. I apply the endogenous grid method to assets a by taking this variable as continu-
ous. This way is efficient because the variation of assets is the largest among the endogenous state
variables. When solving the problems, I regard the choice of health insurance i¯
′
and health capital
for the next period h¯
′
as given states, and apply the endogenous grid method to asset holdings a
′
in the next period.
G.2 Calculating the Risky Borrowing Limit (Credit Limit) (vG,N)
I set up the feasible sets of the solution based on the work in Arellano (2008) and Clausen and Strub
(2017). They investigate the property of the risky borrowing limits (credit limits). They show that
the size of loan q(a
′
)a
′
increases with a
′
for any optimal debt contract. If the size of loan q(a
′
)a
′
decreases in a
′
, households can increase their consumption by increasing debts, which is not an
optimal debt contract. Arellano (2008) (Clausen and Strub (2017)) defines the risky borrowing
limit (credit limit) to be the lower bound of the set for optimal contract. For example, in Figure 17,
B∗ is the risky borrowing limit.
Figure 17: Risky Borrowing Limit (Arellano (2008))
For each state s
′
p = (¯i
′
, h¯
′
, j, η), I calculate the risky borrowing limit a
′
rbl(s
′
p) such that
∀a
′
≥ arbl(s
′
p),
∂q(a
′
, s
′
p)a
′
∂a′
=
∂q(a
′
, s
′
p)
∂a′
a
′
+ q(a
′
, s
′
p) > 0. (39)
I compute the numerical derivative of the discount rate of loan prices q(a
′
, s
′
p) over the grid of asset
holdings Ga′ in the following way:
Da′q(a
′
k, s
′
p) =


q(a
′
k+1
,s
′
p)−q(a
′
k
,s
′
p)
a
′
k+1
−a
′
k
, for k < Na′
q(a
′
k
,s
′
p)−q(a
′
k−1
,s
′
p)
a′
k
−a′
k−1
, for k = Na′ .
(40)
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I calculate the risky borrowing limit arbl(·) for each state s
′
p and fix them as the lower bound of the
feasible set for the solution of asset holdings a
′
. For each state s
′
p, I denoteG
rbl(s
′
p)
a′
as the collection
of all of the grid points for asset holdings a
′
k above the risky borrowing limit arbl(s
′
p), which means
for all a
′
k ∈ G
rbl(s
′
p)
a′
, a
′
k > arbl(s
′
p).
G.3 Identifying (Non-) Concave Regions
Note that the FOC (17) is not sufficient but necessary, because of non-concavities on the expected
value functionWG(a
′
, s
′
p)with respect to a
′
. If the concave regions can be identified, the FOC (17)
is a sufficient and necessary condition for an optimal choice of asset holdings a
′
on the concave
region. I use the algorithm of Fella (2014) to divide the domain of the expected value functions
G
rbl(s
′
p)
a
′ into the concave and non-concave regions.
For each state s
′
p, the concave region is identified by two threshold grid points a¯
′
(s
′
p) and a
′
(s
′
p)
that satisfy the following condition: for any a
′
i ∈ G
rbl(s
′
p)
a′
and a
′
j ∈ G
rbl(s
′
p)
a′
with a¯
′
(s
′
p) < a
′
i < a
′
j
(a
′
i < a
′
j < a
′
(s
′
p)), Da′W
G(a
′
i, s
′
p, hc) > Da′W
G(a
′
j, s
′
p, hc).
28 This condition implies that for all
grid points of which values are greater than a¯
′
(s
′
p) (less than a
′
(s
′
p)), the derivative of the expected
value function Da′ (·, s
′
p) strictly decreases with asset holdings a
′
.
For each state s
′
p, I take the following steps to find the thresholds a¯
′
(s
′
p) and a
′
(s
′
p). First, I
check the discontinuous points of the derivative of the expected value function Da′W
G(a
′
, s
′
p, hc).
I compute the derivative of the expected value function Da′W
G(a
′
, s
′
p, hc) in the same way as
the derivative of the discount rate of loan price (40). Second, among the discontinuous points,
I find the minimum value, which is vmax(s
′
p). Third, I search for the maximum a
′
i ∈ G
rbl(s
′
p)
a
′
satisfying Da′W
G(a
′
, s
′
p, hc) ≤ vmax(s
′
p). The maximum is defined as a¯
′
(s
′
p). Fourth, among the
discontinuous points, I find the maximum value, which is vmin(s
′
p). Then, I search for the minimum
a
′
i ∈ G
rbl(s
′
p)
a
′ satisfying Da′W
G(a
′
, s
′
p, hc) ≥ vmin(s
′
p).The minimum is defined as a
′
(s
′
p).
G.4 Computing the Endogenous Grid for the Cash on Hand
∂q(a
′
k, s
′
p)a
′
k
∂a′
∂u(c, hc)
∂c
=
∂WG(a
′
k, s
′
p,hc)
∂a′
. (41)
First, for each state s
′
p and hc, and for each grid point a
′
k ∈ G
rbl(s
′
p)
a
′ , I retrieve the endogenously-
driven consumption c(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc) from the FOC (41). Since the utility function has a CES aggre-
gator, the endogenously-driven consumption c(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc) cannot be computed analytically. I use
28For each s
′
p, the thresholds are the same across hc because the survival rate πj+1|j(hc, jg) is a constant number.
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the bisection method to compute the endogenously-driven consumption c(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc). Second, I
compute the endogenously-determined cash on hand O(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc) = c(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc) + q(a
′
k, s
′
p)a
′
k.
Lastly, I store the pairs of ((a
′
k, s
′
p, hc), O(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc)).
G.5 Storing the Value Function over the Endogenous Grid for Cash on
Hand
For each state s
′
p and hc, and for each grid point ak ∈ G
rbl(s
′
p)
a
′ , I compute the value function of
non-defaulters with good credit vG,N over the endogenous grid for cash on hand O(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc) in
the following way:
v˜G,N(O(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc), s
′
p, hc) = u(O(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc)− q(a
′
k, s
′
p)a
′
k,hc) +W
G(a
′
k, s
′
p,hc). (42)
Note that (i) (42) is irrelevant to any max operator and (ii) the value function
vG,N(O(a
′
k, s
′
p), s
′
p) is valued on the endogenous grid, not on the exogenous grid. I store the com-
puted value vG,N over the endogenous grid for cash on hand O(a
′
k, s
′
p).
G.6 Identifying the Global Solution on the Endogenous Grid for Cash on
Hand
Using information about the identification of (non-) concave regions on asset holdings a
′
in G.3, I
identify the global solutions on the pair of (a
′
k, O(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc)).
Specifically, I take the following steps. First, for each state (s
′
p, hc), I identify (a
′
k, O(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc))
as the pairs of the global solution if a
′
k ≥ a¯
′
(s
′
p) or a
′
k ∈ [arbl(s
′
p), a
′
(s
′
p)]. Note that the FOC (17)
is sufficient and necessary here, as these pairs are on the concave region of the global solution. I
save these pairs.
Second, for each state (s
′
p, hc) and each a
′
k ∈ (a
′
(s
′
p), a¯
′
(s
′
p)), I check whether the pair of
(a
′
k, O(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc)) implies the global solution in the following way:
a
′
g = argmax
{a
′
j∈(a
′
(s′p),a¯
′ (s′p))}
u(O(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc)− q(a
′
j, s
′
p)a
′
j, hc) +W
G(a
′
j, s
′
p, hc). (43)
If a
′
g = a
′
k, then I identify the pair of (a
′
k, O(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc)) as an global solution. Otherwise, I discard
the pair of (a
′
k, O(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc)).
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G.7 Interpolating the Value Function on the Endogenous Grid for Assets
Given the saved pairs of (a
′
k, O(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc)) and (i, h, ǫe, ǫn), I compute the corresponding cur-
rent assets a. Due to the non-linear progressive tax and insurance subsidies, for each pair of
(a
′
k, O(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc)) and for each (i, h, ǫe, ǫn), I find the corresponding assets a by using the Newton-
Raphson method. Then I obtain the pairs of (a(a
′
ks
′
,hc, i,h, ǫe, ǫn), a
k). Note that these pairs cor-
respond to global solutions, as the saved pairs of (a
′
k, O(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc)) implies the global solutions.
G.8 Interpolating the Value Function on the Endogenous Grid for Assets
Given the saved pairs of (a
′
k, O(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc)) and (i, h, ǫe, ǫn), I compute the corresponding cur-
rent assets a. Due to the non-linear progressive tax and insurance subsidies, for each pair
of (a
′
k, O(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc)) and for each (i, h, ǫe, ǫn), I find the corresponding assets a by using
the Newton-Raphson method. Then, for each state, (s
′
p, i, h, ǫe, ǫn), I obtain the pairs of
(a(a
′
k, s
′
p, i, h, ǫe, ǫn), a
′
). Note that these pairs correspond to global solutions, as the saved pairs
of (a
′
k, O(a
′
k, s
′
p, hc)) implies the global solutions.
G.9 Evaluating the Value Function over the Exogenous Grid for the Current
Assets
Since the value function v˜G,N and decision rule gG,N preserve the monotonicity with the current
asset a, it is possible to interpolate the value on the exogenous grid for assets Ga. For each state
(s
′
p, i, h, ǫe, ǫn), using a linear interpolation, I find a0 such that a0 = a(a
′
= 0, s
′
p, i, h, ǫe, ǫn).
If the value of grid ai ∈ Ga is above a0, I use a linear interpolation to compute the value
function of v˜G,N and gG,N on the exogenous grid of the current assets Ga. If ai ∈ Ga is lower than
a0, I use the grid search method.
G.10 Optimize the discrete choices
Until this step, the choice of health insurance i
′
and health capital h
′
are given statuses. Optimize
these two choices by searching the grid for each variable. The number of grid points for these
variables is relatively smaller than that of grid points on asset a. Therefore, the computation is not
so costly in this procedure. Formally, solve the following problems:
vG,N(a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω, j) = max
{i
′
,h
′
}
v˜G,N(a, i
′
, h
′
, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω, j)
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G.11 Interpolating the Value Function on the Grid for Assets
Given a state s
′
p and (i, h, ǫe, ǫn), since the level of assets a has a monotonic relation with cash
on hand O, it is possible to interpolate the value function v˜G,N and decision rule gG,N over the
exogenous grid of cash on hand GO into the grid for assets Ga. Due to the non-linear progressive
tax and insurance subsidies, for each state s
′
p and (i, h, ǫe, ǫn), and for each grid point of the cash
on hand Ok ∈ GO, I find the corresponding assets a by using the Newton-Raphson method.
Next, using a linear interpolation, for each state s
′
p and (i, h, ǫe, ǫn), I evaluate the value function
v˜G,N and decision rule gG,N on the grid for the current assets Ga.
G.12 Optimize the discrete choices
Until this step, the choice of health insurance i
′
and health capital h
′
are given statuses. Optimize
these two choices by searching the grid for each variable. The number of grid points for these
variables is relatively smaller than that of grid points on asset a. Therefore, the computation is not
so costly in this procedure. Formally, solve the following problems:
vG,N(a, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω, j) = max
{i′ ,h′}
v˜G,N(a, i
′
, h
′
, i, h, ǫe, ǫn, η, ω, j)
G.13 Solving the Other Values
I use the grid search method to solve defaulting values vG,D and vB,D, because they do not an
intertemporal choice on assets and the number of grid points over health insurance i and health
status h is relatively small.
For values of retired households vG,r and vB,r and values of non-defaulting households with
a bad credit history vB,N , I apply the endogenous grid method of Fella (2014). It is almost the
same as the previous steps other than G.2, as there is no unsecured debt in these problems. The
lower bounds of feasible solution set are given by zero assets (vB,N , vB,r) or the natural borrowing
limit (vG,r). Precisely, with the predetermined borrowing limits, I take the steps of Section G.1
and Section G.3- Section G.11.
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G.14 Updating the Expected Value Functions and Loan Price Schedules for
age j − 1
First, I update the value functions V G(s) and V B(s).
V G(s) = max{vG,N(s), vG,D(s−a)} (44)
V B(s) = max{vG,N(s), vG,D(s−a)}
Second, I update the expected value functions WG(s
′
p, hc) and W
B(s
′
p, hc) for age j − 1 and age
group jg.
WG(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
, η, j, hc) = πj|j−1(hc, jg)
∑
ǫ′n,ǫ
′
e,η
′ ,ω′
πǫ′e|h′πǫ′n|h′πη′ |ηπω′ |η′V
G(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
, η
′
e, η
′
n, η
′
, ω
′
, j)
WB(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
, η, j, hc) = πj|j−1(hc, jg)
∑
ǫ′n,ǫ
′
e,η
′ ,ω′
πǫ′e|h
′πǫ′n|h
′πη′ |ηπω′ |η′V
B(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
, η
′
e, η
′
n, η
′
, ω
′
, j)
(45)
Lastly, the loan price function q(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
; , j − 1, η) is updated in the following way:
d(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
; j − 1, η) =
∑
ǫ′n,ǫ
′
e,η
′ ,ω′
πǫ′e|h′πǫ′n|h′πη′ |ηπω′ |η′1{vG,N (a′ ,i′ ,h′ ,ǫ′e,ǫ
′
n,η
′ ,ω′ ,j) ≤ vG,D(i′ ,h′ ,ǫ′e,ǫ
′
n,η
′ ,ω′ ,j)}
q(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
; j − 1, η) =
1− d(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
; j, η)
1 + rrf
where d(a
′
, i
′
, h
′
; j − 1, η) is the expected default probability with state (a
′
, i
′
, h
′
; j − 1, η).
I repeatedly take these steps (G.1 - G.10) until the initial age.
Appendix H Offer Rate of Employer-Based Health Insurance
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Table 30: Offer Rate of Employer-Based Health Insurance
Age
Earnings PCT 23-34 35-46 47-55 56-64
0-2.9 0.413 0.365 0.368 0.399
2.9-6.6 0.449 0.487 0.428 0.43
6.6-12.3 0.322 0.386 0.4 0.376
12.3-20.5 0.352 0.437 0.514 0.494
20.5-31.1 0.376 0.597 0.669 0.633
31.1-43.5 0.511 0.744 0.793 0.747
43.5-56.5 0.673 0.834 0.845 0.789
56.5-68.9 0.791 0.89 0.878 0.82
68.9-79.5 0.846 0.91 0.899 0.847
79.5-87.7 0.884 0.912 0.902 0.855
87.7-93.4 0.916 0.918 0.9 0.859
93.4-97.1 0.912 0.887 0.876 0.813
97.1-100 0.884 0.912 0.913 0.854
Source: author’s calculation based on the MEPS
2000-2011
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